CAT/C/37/D/282/2005** Page 9 have been obtained before the refugee hearing and therefore could not be considered as new evidence. In fact, the documents were found in storage at the complainant’s mother’s home. 5.5 While the PRRA officer did not contest that there was significant, unusual scarring on the complainant’s head, scalp and body, she dismissed the medical report because the doctor’s opinion was based on a “clinical interview” with the complainant and a review of her Personal Information Form. These comments reflect a complete lack of training or understanding about the nature of medical evidence. Thus, the complainant argues that crucial medical and psychological evidence have never been properly considered at any stage of the refugee process. The dismissal by the PRRA officer of the medical evidence was arbitrary, unreasonable and completely incorrect. As to the writ of summons, the PRRA officer accorded it “minimal weight”, drawing on research concerning criminal proceedings in Iran. This is an inappropriate comparison as the writ indicates that it was issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court, which presides over religious matters. 5.6 With regard to the H&C decision, the complainant recalls that the Committee has noted its limitations9 and that in the present case the H&C review and the PRRA were performed by the same officer. In her decision on the H&C, the officer referred to her findings in the PRRA and many of the paragraphs in the PRRA are copied verbatim in the H&C. It is submitted that the H&C was not an independent review and suffered from the same flaws as the PRRA. 5.7 With regard to inconsistencies in her testimony, the complainant submits that none of them go to the heart of her account and that her overall account has always been consistent. She recalls that the Committee has frequently acknowledged that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture.10 It has also held that a medical diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is a relevant factor in considering whether inconsistencies detract from a claimant’s credibility.11 Finally, as to the delay in seeking protection, the Convention for the protection of refugees does not require that a refugee seek protection in the first state to which he flees. 5.8 With regard to the human rights situation in Iran, the complainant recalls that the Committee has previously taken note of the serious human rights situation in Iran in finding that an applicant should not be refouled to that country.12 She submits that the situation in Iran has not improved, and recalls that the General Assembly has recently expressed serious concern at the continuing human rights violations taking place there13. The Committee has persuasive evidence corroborating that the complainant was tortured by the Iranian 9 Counsel refers to Communication No. 133/1999, Enrique Falcon Ríos v. Canada, Views adopted on 23 November 2004. 10 Counsel refers to Communications No. 21/1995, Ismail Alan v. Switzerland, Views adopted on 8 May 1996; and No. 41/1996, Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, Views adopted on 8 May 1996. 11 Counsel refers to Communication No. 43/1996, Kaveh Yaragh Tala v. Sweden, Views adopted on 15 November 1996. 12 Ibid, para.10.4. 13 Counsel refers to Resolution 60/171, adopted in March 2006.