CAT/C/64/D/810/2017 7.2 In accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, the Committee must ascertain whether the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies, although this rule does not apply where remedy procedures exceed a reasonable length of time 21 or are unlikely to bring effective relief to the alleged victim. 7.3 The Committee notes the State party’s claim that the complaint should be declared inadmissible under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention because the complainant has not exhausted all domestic remedies, given that an application for revocation can still be filed against the decision of the Court of Cassation. The Committee also notes the complainant’s argument regarding the special nature of this remedy, which does not have suspensive effect and therefore provides no guarantee of satisfaction. 22 7.4 The Committee refers to its jurisprudence and recalls that in the present case, in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the complainant was only required to apply for remedies that are directly related to her husband’s risk of being subjected to torture in Tunisia.23 The Committee notes that the State party has not specified how an application for revocation of the Court of Cassation decision of 23 November 2016 could affect Mr. Gharsallah’s extradition to Tunisia, as it has not indicated whether that remedy has suspensive effect. The Committee also notes that the State party has not refuted the complainant’s allegation that applications for revocation do not have suspensive effect. The Committee recalls that in several of the cases brought before it, an extradition order was signed by the Head of Government even before the Court of Cassation had ruled on an application for revocation. 24 Considering that Moroccan law does not specify whether this remedy has suspensive effect, that the State party merely cites the exceptional circumstances in which an application for revocation may be filed and that the State party has provided no specific examples of jurisprudence clarifying the suspensive nature of an application for revocation,25 the Committee is not in a position to conclude that the fact that the complainant did not submit an application for revocation prevented her from submitting her complaint to the Committee. In the circumstances of the present case, the Committee finds that article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention does not preclude it from declaring the communication admissible. 7.5 The Committee also notes that the State party has challenged the admissibility of the complaint on the grounds of insufficient substantiation, since the complainant alleges that the extradition request from Tunisia was of a political nature. The State party submits that the alleged victim was able to challenge the arrest warrant before the Court of Cassation, which rejected his claims; that the alleged victim stated, during the hearing before the Crown Prosecutor of the Court of First Instance of Tangier, that he had no fear of being tried by the Tunisian judicial authorities; and that the Moroccan authorities have not identified any risk of torture in the event of extradition. The Committee observes that the complainant has argued that extradition would put her husband at risk, jeopardizing his physical safety and his chances of receiving a fair trial in the Tunisian courts. The Committee therefore finds that the complainant has sufficiently substantiated her complaint for the purposes of admissibility. 7.6 The Committee accordingly finds that the complaint is admissible under article 22 of the Convention with respect to the alleged violation of article 3, and proceeds to consider it on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 21 22 23 24 25 GE.18-15280 See Asfari v. Morocco (CAT/C/59/D/606/2014), paras. 12.2, 8.1 and 8.2. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, paras. 13, 18 (e) and 34. See A.R. v. Sweden, communication No. 170/2000 (A/57/44, para. 204 et seq.), para. 7.1, and Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 14.3. See also general comment No. 4, para. 34. See R.A.Y. v. Morocco (CAT/C/52/D/525/2012), paras. 6.3 and 6.4. Ibid., para. 6.3. 7