CAT/C/71/D/865/2018 of torture is absolute and non-derogable and that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State party to justify acts of torture.17 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to Ethiopia. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.18 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 19 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017), according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee’s practice in this context has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”. 20 Indications of personal risk may include in particular the political affiliation or political activities of the complainant or members of his or her family, or the existence of an arrest warrant without a guarantee of fair treatment and trial. 21 The Committee recalls that the burden of proof is upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, personal, present and real. However, when complainants are in a situation where they cannot elaborate on their case, the burden of proof is reversed and the State party concerned must investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the communication is based.22 The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the information available to it in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case.23 7.5 In the present case, the Committee notes the complainant’s argument that his removal to Ethiopia would constitute a violation by Switzerland of his rights under article 3 of the Convention. The Committee also notes the complainant’s claim that, as a member of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in exile, critical of the Ethiopian authorities, and as a member of the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front and the Ginbot 7 movement, he is likely to be subjected to ill-treatment in the event of his return to his country of origin. 7.6 The Committee recalls that it must ascertain whether the complainant would currently run the risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Ethiopia. It notes that the complainant had ample opportunity to provide supporting evidence and more details about his claims, at the national level, to the Federal Office for Migration, and then to the State Secretariat for Migration, and before the Federal Administrative Court, but that the evidence provided did not lead the national authorities to conclude that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of his return to Ethiopia, and 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 GE.21-14023 Committee against Torture, general comment No. 2 (2007), para. 5. Alhaj Ali v. Morocco (CAT/C/58/D/682/2015), para. 8.3; R.A.Y. v. Morocco (CAT/C/52/D/525/2012), para. 7.2; and L.M. v. Canada (CAT/C/63/D/488/2012), para. 11.3. Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 15.3. Committee against Torture, general comment No. 4, para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., para. 38. Ibid., para. 50. 7