CAT/OP/CHE/ROSP/1 that it was not a legally independent administrative unit and that it had no legal personality.3 They were also of the view that, because the General Secretariat of the Federal Department of Justice and Police exercised administrative oversight over the Commission, the criteria for the independence of national preventive mechanisms set out in article 18 (1) of the Optional Protocol were not met. 20. The legal opinion is based on a legal interpretation of the operational independence of mechanisms within the meaning of article 18 (1) of the Optional Protocol and in the light of international law, the practice of the Subcommittee and the Paris Principles, referred to in article 18 (4) of the Optional Protocol. 21. The Subcommittee notes, in line with the conclusions drawn in the analysis by Kälin and Nowak, that the mechanism does not have an institutional identity distinct from that of the Federal Department of Justice and Police and that it cannot therefore be considered an independent mechanism within the meaning of article 18 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 22. The Subcommittee further notes that the lack of clarity as to the structure of the mechanism and its place within the Federal Department of Justice and Police is helping to create the impression that it is not independent, technically or structurally, which is detrimental not only to the proper functioning of a national preventive mechanism but also to its perception by other actors, in particular persons deprived of their liberty. 23. The Subcommittee’s experience shows that a national preventive mechanism fulfils its mandate much more effectively if it is independent and recognized as such. 24. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party sever the links between the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture and the Federal Department of Justice and Police so that the Commission can function with complete independence, both institutional and operational, and carry out all its activities and tasks separately from those of the Federal Department of Justice and Police, by having its own structure. B. Budget 25. The budget of the General Secretariat of the Federal Department of Justice and Police provides for the expenditures of the Federal Arbitration Commission for the Exploitation of Copyrights and Related Rights and the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture, both of which are linked administratively to the General Secretariat. 4 The National Commission for the Prevention of Torture thus does not have its own budget guaranteeing it the independence envisaged in the Optional Protocol. 26. The Commission and its staff cannot become structurally and operationally independent without budgetary autonomy and a guarantee that the State party will allocate the necessary resources for the Commission’s functioning, in accordance with article 18 (3) of the Optional Protocol. 27. The Subcommittee therefore recommends that the State party provide the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture with a budget separate from that of the Federal Department of Justice and Police so that it can be financially autonomous and, as a result, operationally independent. C. Financial resources 28. The Federal Council dispatch regarding Federal Act No. 150.1, pursuant to which the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture was established, states that the 3 4 GE.21-03779 W. Kälin et M. Nowak, « Rechtliche Aspekte der Unabhängigkeit der Nationalen Kommission zur Verhütung der Folter (NKVF) », avis juridique à l’intention de la CNPT, 2017, p. 10. Suisse, Administration fédérale des finances, Budget 2020 avec plan intégré des taches et des finances 2021-2023 des unités administratives, tome 2A, p. 193. 5