CAT/OP/MDA/1 Office mandate, such as individual complaints, which may undermine the preventive focus of the NPM work. 16. Whilst welcoming assurances of the Ministry of Justice that, despite current economic crisis, the budget of the Ombudsmen Office will be increased, the Subcommittee stresses that only financial autonomy of the NPM can guarantee its functional independence. In addition, the Subcommittee learned that the authorities rejected a proposal to review salary grades of the employees of the Centre for Human Rights and the request to allow certain salary supplements for activity under high health and life risk conditions. 17. The Subcommittee reminds that the provision of adequate financial and human resources constitutes a legal obligation of the State party under article 18.3 of the OPCAT. Within Ombudsman Plus model freely chosen by the State party, a specialized subunit dedicated only and exclusively to the preventive mandate of the NPM shall be created. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party allocate to the NPM a separate and adequate budget to allow for its complete financial and operational autonomy3. Moreover, the Subcommittee recommends that the State party improve the working conditions by providing honorarium and administrative support team to the members of the Consultative Council, as well as by reviewing the salary scale of the employees of the subunit on prevention of the Centre for Human Rights. 18. Independence and expertise. Although it is comprised of the Consultative Council together with the Centre for Human Rights, the NPM is legally placed under the Chair of the Parliamentary Advocate (Ombudsman). Hence, the support team, employed by the Ombudsman office, is dependent on his instructions and not on the collegial body of the NPM. This controverts article 18.1 of OPCAT setting out that States Parties shall guarantee the independence of the NPM personnel. Moreover, the NPM as a collegial body does not have access to the budget, which is administered solely by the Centre for Human Rights, and, thus, cannot decide independently on the use of resources, according to the priorities and evaluation of needs (which should be made by the NPM as a collegial body). 19. The Subcommittee was informed that, allegedly, the procedure used to appoint the members of the Consultative Council has not been entirely transparent and inclusive. Also, a limited number of candidatures was received which indicates that more efforts need to be made to publicly announce the vacancies, disseminate information and raise visibility of the selection process. The Subcommittee notes that any perceived or real conflict of interests of the selection panel could cause damage to the legitimacy of the elections and, thus, should be avoided. 20. The Subcommittee highlights that it is the responsibility of the State party to ensure that the elected members of the NPM have the required capabilities and professional knowledge,4 and that the NPM enjoys complete financial and operational autonomy when carrying out its functions under the OPCAT5. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party (a) Ensure independence of the NPM Secretariat to support effectively the activities of the collegial body of the NPM; (b) Allow the NPM as a collegial body to have budgetary independence by ensuring access to a budget of its own; 3 4 5 CAT/OP/12/5, para.12. Article 18 OPCAT. Para.12 Guidelines on NPM, CAT/OP/12/5. 5