provided report does not suffice as proof and requests a copy of the written report by the embassy, with the name of the sources deleted if necessary. individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 13.9 Counsel also refers to information provided by the Swedish embassy in Lima in the case of the author’s mother, which proved to be wrong on the facts. This, she claims, means that information provided by the Swedish embassy must be treated with caution. Counsel also refers to the case of Napoleon Aponte Inga (who was tortured upon his return to Peru), of which the Swedish embassy seems to be unaware, although he was finally granted de facto asylum in Sweden. 13.10 Counsel submits that, while the situation in Peru may have improved as regards disappearances and judicial killings, the use of torture is still widespread and systematic. She refers to a report of Human Rights Watch/Americas of August 1996, which indicates that torture is generally practised in cases involving terrorism and thus contradicts the State party’s argument that it is mainly poor people, peasants and young criminals who suffer torture. 14.3 The Committee notes that the facts on which the author’s asylum claim is based are not in dispute. The author is a member of Sendero Luminoso and on 1 November 1989 participated in a demonstration where he handed out leaflets and distributed handmade bombs. Subsequently, the police searched his house and the author went into hiding and left the country to seek asylum in Sweden. It is, further, beyond dispute that the author comes from a politically active family, that one of his cousins disappeared and another was killed for political reasons, and that his mother and sisters have been granted de facto refugee status by Sweden. 13.11 Counsel contests the State party’s argument that the author is untrustworthy because he cannot name the leader of his cell. She refers to her submission of 7 November 1990 to the Immigration Board in which she disclosed the name of the cell leader. 14.4 It appears from the State party’s submission and from the decisions by the immigration authorities in the instant case, that the refusal to grant the author asylum in Sweden is based on the exception clause of article 1 F. of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This is illustrated by the fact that the author’s mother and sisters were granted de facto asylum in Sweden, since it was feared that they may be subjected to persecution because they belong to a family which is connected to Sendero Luminoso. No ground has been invoked by the State party for its distinction between the author, on the one hand, and his mother and sisters, on the other, other than the author’s activities for Sendero Luminoso. 13.12 Finally, the author refers to the importance attached by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the experience of relatives. In this context, she recalls that two of the author’s cousins were killed for political reasons and another cousin was granted political asylum in the Netherlands. Counsel also submits that although the author has been active for Sendero Luminoso, he himself never committed any crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, and therefore he should not be excluded from protection under article 1 F. of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 14.5 The Committee considers that the test of article 3 of the Convention is absolute. Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to another State, the State party is under obligation not to return the person concerned to that State. The nature of the activities in which the person concerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a determination under article 3 of the Convention. 14.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention. 14.2 The Committee must decide, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 1, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that Mr. Tapia Páez would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Peru. In reaching this decision, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim of the determination, however, is to establish whether the 14.6 In the circumstances of the instant case, as set out in paragraph 14.3 above, the Committee considers that the grounds invoked by the State party to justify its decision to return the author to Peru do 36