that it would not contest the admissibility of the communication, since the author had exhausted all available domestic remedies. to prove the existence of substantial grounds to believe that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, for instance if the violations are directed against a particular group of persons in a confined territory and the individual to be returned belongs to that group. The State party submits that this is not the case with the author of the present communication. State party’s observations on the merits of the communication 6.1 By submission of 7 March 1994, the State party recalls that the Federal Refugee Office has, on 31 January 1992, rejected the author’s application to be recognized as a refugee, on the basis that there were several contradictions in his testimony, that the principal document, the provisional release order, had no legal value, that the medical certificates were not persuasive and that in general the author’s allegations were not reliable. The Federal Refugee Office was of the opinion that the situation in Zaire was not one of systematic violence. 6.4 In support of its interpretation of article 3 of the Convention, the State party refers to the jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights, establishing that a decision to expel an asylum-seeker may give rise to an issue under article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he faces a real risk of being subjected to torture. In the Commission’s opinion, a reference to the general situation in a country is not sufficient to preclude the return of an individual, as it must be shown that the individual himself is at risk. The State party further refers to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Vilvarajah et al. v. United Kingdom, where it was held that a mere possibility of ill-treatment because of the general situation in a country was not in itself sufficient to give rise to a violation of article 3. The State party argues that article 3 of the Convention against Torture does not provide a wider protection than article 3 of the European Convention. It adds that the author himself is apparently of the same opinion, since he did not deem it necessary to invoke article 3 of the Convention against Torture while exhausting his domestic remedies, but only invoked article 3 of the European Convention. 6.2 As to the author’s specific claim that his expulsion would be in violation of article 3 of the Convention, the State party notes that the author has not raised this objection before any of the national authorities, but has only invoked article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The State party refers to the author’s argument that the existence in a State of a consistent pattern of human rights violations would by itself be sufficient reason not to return anyone to that State. The State party considers the issue raised by the author of great importance for the interpretation and application of article 3 of the Convention; it points out that, if the general situation in a country alone would suffice to conclude that substantial grounds exist for believing that someone, if returned, would be subjected to torture, the requirement of article 3, paragraph 1, that the belief concerns the individual personally, would no longer have a separate meaning. The State party concludes therefore that the interpretation as suggested by the author is incompatible with article 3 and with a systematic and teleological interpretation thereof. It submits that article 3, paragraph 1, stipulates the conditions in which a State party is precluded from expelling an individual from its territory, whereas paragraph 2 prescribes how to appreciate the evidence when determining the existence of such conditions. 6.5 The State party submits that the author of the present communication does not have substantial grounds to believe that he himself would be in danger of being subjected to torture in case of his return to Zaire. Even taking into account the general situation in Zaire, the State party claims that the evidence adduced by the author does not support his allegations. In this context, the State party submits that it has, on several occasions, contacted its embassy at Kinshasa before taking its decision not to grant the author asylum. The embassy contacted an informant from the human rights movement in Zaire, who advised the embassy that the author’s story was highly unlikely. He affirmed that the provisional release order was a document without any legal value and that all released prisoners were provided with a “fiche de libération”, which the author did not possess. Moreover, the signature on the order produced by the author does not correspond with the signature of the director of the military prison in which the author allegedly was detained. The State party further submits that the author’s name does not figure in the Ndolo prison registers for 1989 and 6.3 The State party submits that, even if a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights exists in a country, this should only be taken as an indication when examining all the circumstances to determine whether the person to be returned would be in concrete danger of being tortured. The existence of the “substantial grounds” of paragraph 1 has to be determined in the light of all the circumstances in a particular case. The State party argues that only in exceptional circumstances would a reference to a situation of gross violations of human rights suffice 17