That wording alone was sufficient to make the complaint of Mr. Arkauz inadmissible, as the practice of the administrative courts consistently requires complainants to challenge current and existing decisions. Therefore, the fact that no ruling had been made on the complaint by 13 January 1997, when the deportation order was issued, does not appear to be decisive in the present case. The judgement was given two days later, i.e., less than a month after registration of the application. The rendering of this court decision was obviously not a matter of the greatest urgency, since it related not to a current but to a possible measure. Spain as the country of destination, he was prevented by the authorities from communicating with his wife and counsel. Furthermore, when the latter asked the authorities for news about the author, no information was given to them. Thus, contrary to the State party’s contention, it was made impossible for the author, after notification of the deportation order and before its execution, to apply for a remedy, to be brought before a person capable of receiving such an application or to communicate with persons who could have acted in his place. 8.2 The author indicates that the applications made to the Administrative Court of Limoges were referred, on 27 July 1998, for consideration by the Administrative Court of Pau, which rendered its judgement on 4 February 1999. The judgement states that while at the time of its submission the request was premature, the issuance of the orders of 13 January 1997 calling for the deportation of Mr. Arkauz and his return to Spain had the effect of regularizing the request. The Court also found the handing over of the author to the Spanish security forces to be illegal and therefore annulled that measure. However, an appeal to a French administrative court has no suspensive effect and the Administrative Court of Pau did not reach a decision on the author’s request until two years after the actual implementation of the deportation order. The finding of the author’s surrender to be illegal therefore has only a symbolic effect in the circumstances of the present case. 7.2 The author failed to lodge an appeal against the ministerial order of 13 January 1997 calling for his deportation from French territory and against the decision specifying Spain as the country of destination. An application for a stay of execution under article L.10 of the Code of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts of Appeal, a possibility of which the complainant was clearly aware, was both an appropriate and available remedy. It was not, however, used. The State party therefore submits that the Committee should declare the communication inadmissible under rule 110, paragraph 6, of the rules of procedure. 7.3 The State party argues that the execution of the deportation measure in question in no way resulted from a desire of the Government to obviate the right of recourse available to the person concerned, both at national and international level. It was physically impossible for the Government to have known on 13 January 1997, the day on which the deportation order was issued and implemented, of the request for a stay of execution made by the Committee in its letter of 13 January 1997, that letter having been received the following day by the State party, as attested by the stamp placed on the said document when it arrived. It was therefore impossible for the request to be taken into consideration before the execution of the measure. State party’s merits observations 9.1 The State party notes that, on arrival in France, the author was given temporary permits to stay as an asylum-seeker but the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) and the Refugee Appeals Board rejected his asylum request in 1981. Thereafter, he neither reapplied for refugee status, as he could have done, nor looked for another country prepared to accept him, although his situation was irregular and he knew that he might be subject to an enforceable measure of banishment. In 1992 he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, a ten-year prohibition on residence and a three-year ban from French territory for conspiring with others to commit one or more offences, as well as for illegally bearing weapons, keeping explosives and munitions and using false administrative documents. That conviction automatically gave rise to the possibility of deportation. 7.4 The deportation measure was implemented on 13 January 1997, since on that date the author had paid the sum he owed to the Treasury following his court conviction and there was then no reason, bearing in mind the threat that his presence would represent for public order after his release, to defer a decision to call for and proceed with his deportation. Although the author claims that it was physically impossible for him to enter an appeal, he offers no proof of this, and he certainly does not deny that the notice of the deportation order, which he refused to sign, included information about the procedures and time limits for an appeal. 9.2 The State party indicates that the real risks mentioned by the author were evaluated by the national authorities prior to implementation of the deportation procedure, according to the criteria defined in article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Further comments by the author 8.1 The author states that when he was notified of the deportation order and of the decision indicating 48