a. Identify the permissible ambit of the derogation Derogations on this basis must, in accordance with Article 8, be subject to limitations. In particular, they should be limited in time and must not go beyond what is necessary and proportionate. As a starting point, it is worth establishing, based on the available records, whether a derogation exceeded reasonable limits. For instance, in the Ibrahim and Others case, it was argued that while it may have been justifiable to question the suspects without lawyers initially, the exclusion of the lawyer became impermissible once the lawyer had actually arrived at the police station and was prevented from seeing the client by choice of the officers concerned. The argument is that statements obtained in this context are not covered by the derogation in any event and thus should be regarded as having been obtained in breach of Article 3, and requiring a remedy under Article 12.  Having regard to Article 8, identify the extent to which questioning proceeded unnecessarily in the absence of a lawyer.  Was information found enabling the authorities to avert any danger they may have supposed to exist prior to the derogation?  Did questioning begun in urgency continue after the arrival of a lawyer, indicating that the derogation was maintained for longer than necessary?  Statements or evidence obtained as a result of questioning outside the permissible ambit of the derogation should be treated as having been obtained in breach of Article 3, and remedies applied accordingly in line with Article 12. b. Deal with the information obtained within a valid derogation The core of the issue lies in the evidence obtained during the period when the derogation was valid. In Ibrahim and Others v. United Kingdom, for instance, there was unquestionably a period following arrest where it was reasonable to question the suspects without lawyers if the situation is looked at in light of Article 3(6). An immediate risk existed, and suspects were questioned in that time with a view to averting that risk. What use can be made of incriminating statements made in this context? Fair Trials’ position is that the answer lies in the provisions of recital 31, providing that questioning may be carried out for the sole purpose and to the extent necessary to obtain information that is essential to avert serious adverse consequences for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person. This underlines that the purpose of the derogation is not investigative: it is preventive. This is what justifies the questioning taking place without a lawyer present. In the context of criminal proceedings, criminal procedure standards are required and so the absence of a lawyer means the statements cannot be used for a conviction. We suggest this follows from the wording of Article 12(2). That provision would not need to refer to Article 3(6) at all if it was intended that statements could be used. It would be sufficient that the statements were not obtained in breach of Article 3 (since a derogation was validly applied) and there would be no need for a remedy. Instead, despite the validity of the derogation, meaning there is no breach of Article 3 as such, Article 12(2) specifies that a remedy is needed in the assessment of the statements made by the accused. This suggests evidence obtained under this derogation should be treated in the same way as evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 outright: it cannot be used. 33