CAT/C/56/D/594/2014 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Algeria. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.23 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, in which it states that “the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion”. Although the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the burden of proof normally falls upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she runs a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk.24 The Committee gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 8.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s claim that his expulsion to Algeria would amount to a violation of article 3 of the Convention, as he would be exposed to a risk of being imprisoned and of being subjected to torture by the Algerian authorities since he has been sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The Committee also notes the State party’s allegations that the complainant has not plausibly established his grounds for asylum, as the migration authorities questioned the authenticity of the complainant’s statements, including with regard to the timing of the submission of his asylum request, the possession of a passport, the circumstances of his leaving Algeria and the documents provided by the complainant, and including the summonses from the Algerian police and the copy of the judgement which allegedly sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The Committee also notes the State party’s conclusion that the complainant has not plausibly established his need for protection, insofar as he has not submitted any new evidence in support of his second asylum request, and that the written evidence that was provided with his first request and his oral statements lacked credibility. 8.6 The Committee also notes the complainant’s claim that he will be at risk of extrajudicial killing by terrorists in prison, as he allegedly revealed their plan of armed robbery and that this would have led to the death of two of their colleagues. According to the State party, the complainant has been unable to show that he is suspected of involvement with terrorists, including because he was unable to name, during the proceedings before the Migration Board, the terrorist group that allegedly threatened him. 23 24 See, for example, communication No. 467/2011, Y.B.F., S.A.Q. and Y.Y. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 31 May 2013, para. 7.2, communication No. 392/2009, R.S.M. v. Canada, decision adopted on 24 May 2013, para. 7.3, and communication No. 213/2002, E.J.V.M. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 8.3. See, for example, communications No. 414/2010, N.T.W. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 16 May 2012, para. 7.3, and No. 343/2008, Arthur Kasombola Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012, para. 9.3. 13