CAT/C/56/D/594/2014 which on 19 December 2013 rejected the appeal. On 3 February 2014, the Migration Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal and the decision to expel the complainant became final and non-appealable. The State party emphasizes that the decision to expel the complainant will become statute-barred on 3 February 2018. It implies that the decision to expel the complainant will no longer be enforceable after that date and that the complainant will then no longer be under threat of expulsion. 4.4 The State party submits that the complainant essentially claims that a forced return to Algeria would put him at risk of being subjected to torture by the Algerian authorities while serving a 10-year term of imprisonment with hard labour for a crime he did not commit. He also claims that he would risk upon return being killed by terrorists because of his refusal to cooperate with them and that the Algerian authorities cannot offer him protection against them. He has thus alleged that expelling him to Algeria would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention. 4.5 In regard to admissibility, the State party is not aware of the present matter having been or being subject to any other investigation or settlement, according to article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention. In addition, the State party does not contest that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted. The State party, however, maintains that the complainant’s assertions that he is at risk of being treated in a manner that would amount to a breach of article 3 of the Convention if returned to Algeria fails to rise to the minimum level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. It accordingly submits that the complaint is manifestly unfounded and thus inadmissible pursuant to article 22 (2) of the Convention.9 4.6 As regards the merits, the issue before the Committee is whether the forced return of the complainant to Algeria would violate the obligation of Sweden under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 4.7 The State party recalls that when determining whether the forced return of a person to another State would constitute a violation of article 3, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in that country. It points to the jurisprudence of the Committee that the aim of such a determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country. For a violation of article 3 to be established, additional grounds must exist, showing that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.10 According to the State party, when determining whether the forced return of the complainant to Algeria would constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention, the following considerations are relevant: (i) the general human rights situation in Algeria and, in particular, (ii) the personal risk for the complainant of being subjected to torture upon his return. 4.8 The State party recalls the Committee’s jurisprudence stating that the burden of proof in cases such as the present one rests with the complainant, who must present an 9 10 6 See, for example, communication No. 216/2002, H.I.A. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 2 May 2003, para. 6.2. See, for example, communication No. 150/1999, S.L. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 11 May 2001, para. 6.3, and communication No. 213/2002, E.J.V.M. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 8.3.