CAT/C/52/D/525/2012 stated that the confessions had been made by “persons who harbour hatred towards him and his family”. The Committee therefore finds that article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention does not preclude it from declaring the communication admissible in respect of the alleged violation of article 3, but that the alleged violation of article 15 is not admissible, as it was not raised before the State party’s courts. 6.6 In the light of the above considerations, the Committee decides that the communication is admissible, as far as it raises issues under article 3 of the Convention, and decides to proceed with its examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention. 7.2 The Committee must determine whether the extradition of the complainant to Algeria would violate the State party’s obligations under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention not to expel or return (refouler) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee recalls that the existence in a country of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights is not in itself a sufficient ground for believing that an individual would be subjected to torture.22 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that an individual might not be subjected to torture. 7.3 Recalling its general comment No. 1, the Committee reaffirms that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being “highly probable”, but it must be personal, present, foreseeable and real. 7.4 The Committee also notes that, according to the complainant, the Court of Cassation failed to consider the risk of torture faced by the complainant properly, merely noting that, as Algeria was a party to the Convention against Torture, there was no reason to fear any risk of torture. The Committee observes that, for his part, the complainant merely stated before the Court of Cassation that he feared being subjected to torture in Algeria, without substantiating the allegation, and yet, as noted by the State party, he had not made any such claims during his appearance before the French investigating judge. The Committee recalls that, in assessing the risk of torture to which an individual would be exposed in the context of extradition or deportation proceedings, a State cannot base itself solely on the fact that another State is a party to the Convention against Torture, or that it has provided diplomatic assurances.23 The Committee observes that, in the event, the State party authorities did not possess any evidence allowing them to carry out a more accurate assessment of the vague, general and unsubstantiated allegation of risk of torture made by the complainant. 7.5 The Committee notes that the complainant subsequently attempted to prove that he faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture on the basis of anonymous statements collected by his sister. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence whereby the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory, and indicates that it is generally for the complainant to present an arguable case. 24 On the basis of all the information 22 23 24 GE.14-05418 See Kalinichenko v. Morocco, para. 15.3. See Kalinichenko v. Morocco, para. 15.6, and communication No. 327/2007, Boily v. Canada, paras. 14.4 and 14.5, Views adopted on 14 November 2011. See communication No. 298/2006, C.A.R.M. et al. v. Canada, para. 8.10, decision adopted on 18 May 2007; No. 256/2004, M.Z. v. Sweden, para. 9.3, decision adopted on 12 May 2006; No. 214/2002, 9