CAT/C/34/D/194/2001 page 5 a request for the temporary suspension of the enforcement of the decision under article L.10 of the Code of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts of Appeal, which was in force at that time. 4.3 The State party adds that although, in the decision of 9 November 1999 in relation to communication No. 63/1997, Josu Arkauz Arana v. France,2 the Committee concluded that the complaint was admissible, in view of the fact that “an appeal against the … deportation order issued in respect of the complainant … would not have been effective or even possible, since it would not have had a suspensive effect and the deportation measure was enforced immediately following notification thereof, leaving the person concerned no time to seek a remedy[, and] … the Committee [aga inst Torture] therefore decided … that the communication was admissible”, the State party nevertheless invites the Committee to re-examine its position in the light of the following considerations. The possibility of automatic enforcement of expulsion measures on grounds of public order is allowed for under article 26 bis of the ordinance of 2 November 1945. It addresses the need to deport effectively and promptly aliens whose presence in France constitutes a threat to public order, insofar as allowing them to remain at liberty in France could not but lead to a resumption of their activities endangering public order. However, French law allows judges of administrative courts discretion to order a stay of execution of deportation measures or the temporary suspension of their application. 4.4 The State party also notes that the Act of 30 June 2000, which entered into force on 1 January 2001, enhanced the powers of interim relief judges by providing, in particular, for the stay of measures infringing on a fundamental freedom, the judge being required to rule within 48 hours from the lodging of the application. The complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 In her comments on the State party’s reply, the complainant recalls that with regard to domestic remedies, it was only at 6 a.m. on 28 October 1999 that the authorities notified her of the content of the expulsion order issued on 31 August 1999 by the Minister of the Interior. The French authorities appear to have deliberately kept her in ignorance of the expulsion order issued against her two months previously. At the same time, the police notified her of the decision taken by the Prefect of Val de Marne to specify Spain as the country of destination. 5.2 The complainant adds that she had been held in Fresnes prison, cut off from any contact with her family and her counsel, and was absolutely unable to warn them of her imminent expulsion. She was thus materially prevented by the French authorities from lodging an appeal against the expulsion order and the Prefect’s decision. Similarly, it was materially impossible for her, at 6 o’clock in the morning, to apply to an administrative court for a stay of execution or the temporary suspension of these two decisions. In addition, in that regard, the French Government refers to the Act of 30 June 2000, which was not in force at the time of the events. 5.3 The complainant states that domestic remedies cannot be considered to be effective and available, and that such remedies cannot give satisfaction to an individual who is a victim of a violation of article 3 of the Convention, since they cannot prevent the expulsion of the person concerned to a country where he or she faces a risk of torture. The complainant notes that, under article 22, paragraph 5 (b) of the Convention, the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies