merits. In the absence of any further obstacles to the admissibility of the complaint advanced by the State party, the Committee accordingly proceeds with the consideration of the merits. 12.1The issue before the Committee is whether removal of the complainant to Egypt would violate the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected by the Egyptian authorities to torture. In so doing, the Committee refers to its consistent practice of deciding this question as presented at the time of its consideration of the complaint, rather than as presented at the time of submission of the complaint.c It follows that intervening events transpiring between submission of a complainant and its consideration by the Committee may be of material relevance for the Committee’s determination of any issue arising under article 3. 12.2The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Egypt. It follows from this framing at the issue that the Committee is not asked to decide whether or not Mr. A.’s expulsion from Sweden violated its obligations under article 3, or any other articles of the Convention, much less whether he has or has not endured torture at the hands of the Egyptian authorities. In assessing the risk to the complainant, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would be returned. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must exist to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 12.3In the present case, the Committee observes that the complainant’s husband, Mr. A., was returned to Egypt in December 2001, almost two years prior to the Committee’s consideration of the case. The Committee observes that Mr. A.’s detention has since been monitored by regular visits from the State party’s Ambassador, Embassy staff and high-level representatives of the State party, as well as his family, and that his medical care and conditions of detention were reported to be adequate. The Committee observes that the complainant founds her allegation of a risk of torture solely on her relationship with her husband, Mr. A., and contends that she will be exposed to torture as a result of this link. The Committee refers in this respect to its previous jurisprudence where it rejected a claim of torture arising by virtue of a family relationship to the leadership of an allegedly terrorist organization - such family ties, of themselves, are generally insufficient to ground a claim under article 3.d In light of the passage of time, the Committee is also satisfied by the provision of guarantees against abusive treatment,e which also extend to the complainant and are, at the present time, regularly monitored by the State party’s authorities in situ. It is also relevant to the Committee’s consideration of the case that Egypt, a State party to the Convention, is directly bound properly to treat prisoners within its jurisdiction, and any failure to do so would be a breach of the Convention. In the light of the above circumstances, the Committee considers that there is not, at this time, a substantial personal risk of torture of the complainant in the event of her return to Egypt. 13.The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, considers that the complainant has not substantiated her claim that she would be subjected to torture upon return to Egypt, and therefore concludes that the complainant’s removal to that country at the present time would not constitute a breach by the State party of article 3 of the Convention. Notes Communication No. 203/2002 Submitted by: A.R. (represented by counsel, Mr. R. Himja) Alleged victim: The complainant State party: The Netherlands Date of complaint: 14 March 2002 The Committee against Torture, established under article 17 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Meeting on 14 November 2003, Having concluded its consideration of complaint No. 203/2002, submitted to the Committee against Torture by Mr. A.R. under article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Having taken into account all information made available to it by the author of the complaint, his counsel and the State party, Adopts the following decision under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention. 1.1The complainant is A.R., an Iranian national, born on 30 June 1966, currently residing in the Netherlands and awaiting deportation to Iran. He claims that his forcible return to Iran would constitute a violation by the Netherlands of article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. He is represented by counsel. 1.2On 22 March 2002 the Committee transmitted the complaint to the State party for comments. Facts as submitted by the complainant