2.8On 30 April 2001, the complainant’s representative, Professor Bent Sørensen, an expert in the field of torture identification and research, wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions (thereinafter “the DPP”) requesting an investigation into the possibility that the complainant had been subjected to psychological torture by virtue of her detention in solitary confinement. On 14 August 2001, the DPP responded that he found no basis for initiating such an investigation as, in his opinion, “there is no basis for believing that the pretrial detention in solitary confinement was effected for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession from the person charged or a third party, making it an act of torture as defined in the Convention against Torture”. Despite two further subsequent requests to initiate an investigation, the DPP refused to reconsider his decision. The complaint 3.1Ms. Jensen claims that the State party violated articles 1, paragraph 1, and 16 of the Convention, by subjecting her to psychological torture and acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, by detaining her in solitary confinement from 29 April to 18 June 1998, despite medical evidence demonstrating its adverse effect on her mental health. 3.2The complainant contends that the State party violated article 12 of the Convention, as the DPP failed to carry out a prompt and impartial investigation into the allegations of psychological torture, as requested by her representative. 3.3The complainant argues that she exhausted domestic remedies, as in the last letter written to the DPP her representative had indicated that if the DPP did not respond to his letter, he would assume that domestic remedies were deemed to have been exhausted. The complainant’s representative did not receive a response. The State party’s submission on admissibility and merits 4.1By submission of 26 April 2002, the State party challenges the admissibility and merits of the complaint. It invokes section 762 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which at the time of the complainant’s imprisonment provided for pre-trial detention. Under the applicable terms of this Act, the court decides, at the request of the police, whether the person charged should be held in pre-trial detention. The order must fix a period for the pre-trial detention, which must be as short as possible and may not exceed four weeks. The period may be extended, but not by more than four weeks at a time. An order for detention may be appealed to a superior court. Finally, it states that pre-trial detention must be terminated, if necessary by court order, when the charges are dropped or the conditions for detention no longer exist. If the court finds that the investigation is not pursued with adequate expediency or continued pre-trial detention is not reasonable, the court must terminate it. 4.2The State party furnishes section 770 of the Administration of Justice Act, which provides for detention in solitary confinement. Under this section, it is necessary to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person charged has committed an offence, which is subject to public prosecution and, under the law, may result in imprisonment for at least one year and six months. Proportionality is a precondition for any decision on initiation and continuation of pre-trial detention in solitary confinement. The State party notes that the provisions on pre trial detention in solitary confinement were substantially amended by Act No. 428 of 31 May 2000. The new provisions entered into force on 1 July 2000. The purpose of the amendment was to limit the resort to, and duration of, pre-trial detention in solitary confinement; it provides for more specific criteria for initiating and continuing solitary confinement, and shorter periods of such confinement.a 4.3The State party challenges the admissibility of the complaint for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Firstly, the complainant could have applied to the Board of Appeal for leave to appeal the orders of the High Court to the Supreme Court. Under section 973 of the Act, the Board could have granted leave to appeal, “if the appeal relates to questions of a fundamental nature or specific reasons otherwise make it appropriate”. In support of her application, she could have argued that her pre-trial detention in solitary confinement was contrary to the Convention. The State party notes that the European Court of Human Rights has held that an application to the Board of Appeal for leave to appeal is a remedy that must be exhausted for the purposes of admissibility of a complaint under the European Convention.b 4.4Secondly, although the complainant was convicted, she could have made a claim for compensation under section 1018 a (2) or h of the Act. Pursuant to section 1018 a (2), a person who was arrested or held in pre-trial detention as part of a criminal prosecution is entitled to compensation for injury caused while detained if “the deprivation of liberty applied during the case is not reasonably proportionate to the outcome of the prosecution, or if it is found reasonable for other specific reasons”. The fact that pre-trial detention in solitary confinement is alleged to have harmed the complainant would have been particularly relevant to such a claim for compensation. Pursuant to section 1018 h, anyone may claim compensation in respect of criminal proceedings on the basis of the general rules of tort law. 4.5A claim for compensation under section 1018 a (2) is considered by the Regional Public Prosecutor, with the possibility of appeal to the DPP, and a claim under section 1018 h is considered by the DPP with the possibility of appeal to the Ministry of Justice. In both cases, the complainant would have the possibility of filing a claim before the court, under section 1018 f (1), in the event of a refusal on appeal. To demonstrate that this remedy is available and effective in the circumstances of the present complaint, the State party invokes the following example of a similar case. In a Supreme Court judgement of 5 September 2000, a person who had been acquitted in a criminal case filed a claim for compensation for loss of employment and permanent disablement as a consequence of pre-trial detention in solitary confinement, which had caused mental illness.c In support of the claim, the claimant submitted, inter alia, that he had been subjected to torture contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court found that the pre-trial detention in solitary confinement was the main cause of the claimant’s mental illness and awarded compensation. 4.6On the merits, the State party submits that for an act to be characterized as torture, it must fulfil all the conditions of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention. It submits that it cannot be inferred from the wording of article 1 that pre-trial detention in solitary confinement would come, in principle, within the definition of “torture” in article 1. Although the Committee’s concluding observations on Denmark’s third periodic report notes that the Committee was concerned about the institution of solitary confinement, particularly