CCPR/C/129/D/2970/2017 author also notes that she has been summoned to appear at the offices of the Canada Border Services Agency on 14 March 2019 and fears that she will be deported on this date. 5.2 The author argues that the various appeals she has lodged were not handled in a manner compatible with either the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in particular articles 7 and 12, or the Covenant, as they did not allow an objective and impartial assessment of her case. She stresses that the pre-removal risk assessment is not in conformity with the Covenant, since, in practice, it gives no reasonable chance of having a risk recognized when an application has been dismissed by the Refugee Protection Division. She affirms that the officials responsible for assessing pre-removal risks do not review cases independently and that the decisions against her were, in her case, the result of technicalities. The author is also of the view that she meets the majority of the criteria for an application for permanent resident status on humanitarian grounds and that her application was handled unreasonably, in piecemeal fashion, not, as is standard under Canadian law, as a whole. 10 According to the author, the State party does not provide an effective remedy in cases where the initial decision handed down is not in the applicant’s favour. 5.3 The author points out that articles 2 (3) and 7 of the Covenant entail an obligation of result and that the State party, by taking unreasonable decisions in violation of her fundamental rights, is failing to fulfil this obligation.11 She also recalls that the standards set out in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 12 must be applied in domestic proceedings, particularly with respect to the burden of proof, since it is often the case that an “applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary or other proof”.13 If there are statements that are not susceptible of proof, the applicant should, “unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt”. 14 The author believes that she has submitted substantial evidence and that the burden of proof that she has been asked to bear is excessive. The author thus requests the Committee to reject the State party’s arguments for their lack of a legal basis and for the State party’s factual misjudgment of the evidence in the case file. According to the author, the reasons given for doubting her credibility are insufficient, and the subsequent failures of her applications for review are the result of the unwillingness of the State party’s authorities to correct their errors. 5.4 As for her son’s situation, the author argues that, as mentioned by the State party, it is in the best interests of the child for him to be with his or her parent. In the author’s view, the best interests of the child were not a consideration in the examination of her application for permanent residence on humanitarian grounds. There was no reasonable assessment of what was in his interest or of the living conditions he will have to endure if his mother is sent back to Mauritania, and the official concerned drew erroneous conclusions about his status in Mauritania. The fact that he will be unable to receive treatment for his asthma or to attend school in Mauritania, and that he will be unable to obtain a guarantee of extended stay, was not taken into account. 5.5 The author also asked the Committee to reiterate its request for interim measures, so that she will not be deported to Mauritania. 10 11 12 13 14 6 Federal Court of Canada, Webb v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1060, judgment of 7 September 2012, para. 19. See Shakeel v. Canada (CCPR/C/108/D/1881/2009); and Choudhary v. Canada (CCPR/C/109/D/1898/2009). UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, document with symbol HCR/1P/4/FRE/REV.3. Ibid., para. 196. Ibid. GE.21-00740