Advance unedited version 44. The Committee’s assessment will be primarily based on the information provided by or on behalf of the complainant and by the State party concerned. It will also consult United Nations sources of information as well as any other sources that the Committee considers reliable.80 In addition, the Committee will take into account any of the indications listed in paragraph 29 above as constituting substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported. 45. The Committee will assess “substantial grounds” and consider the risk of torture as foreseeable, personal, present and real when the existence of credible facts relating to the risk by itself, at the time of its decision, would affect the rights of the complainant under the Convention in case of his/her deportation. Indications of personal risk may include, but they are not limited to: (a) the complainant’s ethnic background;81 (b) political affiliation or political activities of the complainant and/or his family members;82 (c) arrest warrant without guarantee of a fair treatment and trial;83 (d) sentence in absentia;84 (e) sexual orientation and gender identity;85 (f) desertion from the army or armed groups; (g) previous torture;86 (h) incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; (i) clandestine escape from the country of origin for threats of torture; (j) religious affiliation;87 (k) violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including violations related to the prohibition of conversion to a religion which is different from the religion proclaimed as State religion and where such a conversion is prohibited and punished in law and in practice;88 (l) risk of expulsion to a third country where the person may be in danger of being subjected to torture89 and (m) violence against women, including rape.90 46. When assessing whether “substantial grounds” exist, the Committee will take into account the human rights situation of that State as a whole and not of a particular area of it. The State party is responsible for any territory under its jurisdiction, or control or authority. The notion of “local danger” does not provide for measurable criteria and is not sufficient to dissipate totally the personal danger of being tortured. 91 47. The Committee considers that the so called “internal flight alternative”, i.e. the deportation of a person or a victim of torture to an area of a State where he/she would not be exposed to torture unlike in other areas of the same State, is not reliable or effective.92 48. When assessing whether “substantial grounds” exist, the Committee considers that a receiving State should have demonstrated certain essential measures to prevent and prohibit torture throughout the entire territory under its jurisdiction, or control or authority, such as clear legislative provisions on the absolute prohibition of torture and its punishment with adequate penalties, measures to put an end to the impunity for acts of torture, violence and 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Rule 118 of the Committee’s rules of procedure. See e.g. communication No. 555/2013, Z. v. Denmark, decision adopted on 10 August 2015, paras. 5.2 and 7.8; and M.B. et al. v. Denmark, paras. 2.1 – 2.2, and 9.7, supra fn. 22. See e.g. communication No. 375/2009, T.D. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 26 May 2011, para. 7.8. See e.g. Nasirov v. Kazakhstan, paras. 7.6 and 11.9., supra fn. 33. See e.g. Agiza v. Sweden, para. 13.4, supra fn. 3; and Ali Fadel v. Switzerland, para. 7.8., supra fn. 22. See e.g. communication No. 338/2008, Uttam Mondal v. Sweden, decision adopted on 23 May 2011, para. 7.7. See e.g. Dadar v. Canada, decision adopted on 23 November 2005, para. 8.5. See e.g. Abdussamatov et al. v. Kazakhstan, decision of 1 June 2012, para. 13.8. See e.g. Abed Azizi v. Switzerland, paras. 3.2 and 8.8, supra fn. 78. See supra fn. 10. See e.g. E.K.W. v. Finland, supra fn. 29, paras. 9.6 – 9.7. See e.g. Uttam Mondal v. Sweden, para. 7.4., supra fn. 85. See e.g. M.K.M. v. Australia, supra fn. 58, para. 8.9. 15