CCPR/C/113/D/2218/2012 5. In cases involving repeated or continuing offences stemming from a constant resolve it appears that the State authorities have a choice between prosecuting the individual for each separate actus reus that he or she committed, i.e. each manifestation of the constant resolve, and prosecuting the individual for an overarching offence involving the rejection of the relevant social norm, i.e. for the whole series of actus rei deriving from the constant resolve. As long as the cumulative severity of sanctions sought for the distinct “smaller” offences does not exceed the sanction that could have been reasonably sought for the overarching “larger” offence, I do not believe that multiple trials for similar yet distinct offences necessarily violate the non bis in idem principle. In fact, holding differently may encourage State parties to seek to impose on an individual being tried a far more severe sanction for the first distinct offence than would otherwise be the case. 6. The facts of the present case exemplify my concerns. The author was tried and convicted in 2009 for refusing to report for military service, but received only a light sentence: a two-year suspended sentence. Only following his second trial did he actually serve a two-year prison sentence. Under those circumstances, it appears that, unlike the second conviction, which resulted in a severe penalty commensurate with the overarching offence attributed to the author by the authorities of the State party, the author’s first conviction did not necessarily reveal an intention by the State authorities to punish him for the overarching offence of rejecting military service, or to designate as free from punishment all future failures to report for service. The result of adopting the approach of the majority, without requiring the author to establish that the first trial should be understood as designed to address all subsequent acts emanating from the constant resolve to refuse military service, might be to induce States parties to treat the first-time offence more severely, not as a distinct “small” offence, but rather as pertaining to the overarching “larger” offence. I fail to see how this would serve to protect the due process rights of individuals under the Covenant. As a result, I do not consider it sufficiently well established that the author’s rights under article 14 7 were violated in the circumstances of the present case. 11