CAT/C/65/D/784/2016 remedies, as they did not seek leave for judicial review of a negative decision arising from the pre-removal risk assessment, and that ��these remedies are not mere formalities”.20 4.4 In addition, the State party asserts that the complainant’s allegations are incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, since the mistreatment the complainant claims she had suffered does not amount to “torture” for the purposes of the Convention. The State party relies on the Committee’s jurisprudence according to which the issue of whether a State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention. 21 The State party submits that the complainant has not demonstrated how the Government of Pakistan had whatsoever consented or acquiesced to the pain or suffering that might be inflicted to the complainant by non-State actors and why her allegations related to the extremist and Islamist groups would amount to exceptional circumstances in which article 3 of the Convention can apply also to the acts of non-State actors. 22 To the contrary, the complainant repeatedly stated that she was threatened and sought after by extremists opposed to the Government of Pakistan. 4.5 Furthermore, the State party submits that the complainant has not sufficiently substantiated any of her allegations or provided any evidence that she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture from the Pakistani authorities or paramilitary groups in Pakistan, and that her removal to Pakistan would amount to a violation of article 3 of the Convention. The State party notes that the complainant has at no time sought the protection of the Pakistani authorities. 23 It recalls that, during her interview with the Refugee Protection Division, the complainant indicated that she did not lodge any complaint, as she considered that her “high-ranking boss” was the best person to protect her. The State party, however, notes that she did not demonstrate that the police could not protect her or that she could not receive police protection upon return to Pakistan if the same problems were to occur. 4.6 Furthermore, the State party recalls that the complainant’s allegations have been considered by competent and impartial domestic processes that did not find a personal risk for the complainant if returned to Pakistan, and that it is not for the Committee to weigh evidence or reassess findings of fact made by domestic courts or tribunals. The State party notes that the complainant failed to provide evidence to support any of her allegations, such as copies of threats that she allegedly received on her cell phone or a notification to her phone company to prove she had changed her phone number. In that context, the Refugee Protection Division officer found that her behaviour was inconsistent with her allegations, as she provided new information just the day before her interview with the Division; she never contacted the police and did not provide evidence that the police could not protect her. Moreover, the complainant applied for asylum only two years after her arrival in Canada. The State party claims that the complainant failed to demonstrate to the relevant Canadian authorities that she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture if returned to Pakistan and that her communication is therefore incompatible with article 22 (2) of the Convention and rule 113 of the rules of procedure of the Committee. 4.7 The State party also rejects the complainant’s arguments that her forcible removal to Pakistan would amount to a violation of article 16 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, that the judicial review is not an effective remedy, as required under article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that the existing procedures are inadequate. The State party considers 20 21 22 23 GE.19-05767 See L.Z.B v. Canada (CAT/C/39/D/304/2006), para. 6.6. See, for example, L.J.R.C. v. Sweden (CAT/C/33/D/218/2002), para. 5.2: ���The issue of whether a State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention, unless the non-governmental entity occupies and exercised quasi-governmental authority over the territory to which the complainant would be returned”. See L.J.R.C. v. Sweden, para. 5.2. See, for example, F.A.B v. Switzerland (CAT/C/43/D/348/2008/Rev.1), para 7.4. 5