Family Law Act ensures the right of the child to receive care from his or her parents. In order to ensure the right of the child to know his or her parents, § 143 of the Family Law Act also establishes the right of the child to maintain personal contact with his or her parents and the right and duty of the parents to maintain personal contact with their child. With regard to contesting the activities of a child protection official, the Chancellor found that a reply to the question under which procedure the activities of a child protection official should be contested can be found in the Administrative Procedure Act and the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, and depending on the legal nature on the contested activity also in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Chancellor explained the competence of civil and administrative courts and found that with regard to the choice of the court it is of decisive importance what specifically is being contested. If the person contests the activity or omission of a child protection official within administrative proceedings, for example finding that the statutory deadline for assessing the need for assistance was violated or the concerned person was not heard in the process of issuing an administrative act, they should have recourse to the administrative court. However, if the person contests interference in his or her own parental right of custody, for example finding that the child was separated without justification, it is a matter of custody rights and the person should have recourse to the civil court. With regard to § 33(1) of the new Child Protection Act which gives child protection officials the right to restrict the communication between the child and the parent for 72 hours in case of separation of the child from the family, the Chancellor found that the Child Protection Act is a lex specialis in relation to the Family Law Act as regards the competence of the child protection official in the case of separation of the child from the family. The Chancellor emphasised that restriction of the right of communication is a temporary and exceptional measure – the child protection official may determine the procedure of communication between the child and the parent for a maximum of 72 hours, after which the official should have recourse to the court. Establishing any more permanent restrictions on the visiting rights and determining the procedure of communication will still remain within the competence of the court under § 143 of the Family Law Act. § 33(1) clause 2 of the new Child Protection Act establishes that a child in danger may be temporarily separated from the family if he person exercising the right of custody over the child refuses the temporary placement of a child with a service provider. The Chancellor found that this provision should be interpreted in combination with § 32(4) of the same Act, which establishes that a child in danger shall be placed in safety at a social, health care or educational institution or person providing such service (i.e. service provider) or at a person who is safe for the child depending on the child’s needs and the situation. As in the case of separation of the child from the family it is inevitable that the child is placed in an institution providing the relevant service, it is obvious that by allowing, in case of existence of the bases provided for in § 135(4) of the Family Law Act, separation of the child from the family without a court’s authorisation the law should also allow the placement of the child in the necessary institution (e.g. a shelter, hospital) without the court’s authorisation. At the same time, the Chancellor expressed the opinion that § 33(1) of the new Child Protection Act could be worded more clearly and in its present form it is confusing. In the opinion of the Chancellor, § 33(1) clauses 1 and 2 of the new Child Protection Act lack an independent regulative effect because the legal basis for a child’s separation from the family is the danger to the child’s life or health as established in § 33(1) (first sentence) of the same Act. 56