11. The Human Rights Committee has noted that: ‘While article 14 is not included in the list of non-derogable rights in article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, States derogating from normal procedures required under article 14 in circumstances of a public emergency should ensure that such derogations do not exceed those strictly required by the exigencies of the actual situation. The guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. Thus, for example, as article 6 of the Covenant is non-derogable in its entirety, any trial leading to the imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must conform to the provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of article 14. Similarly, as article 7 is also non-derogable in its entirety, no statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of this provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by article 14, including during a state of emergency, except if a statement or confession obtained in violation of article 7 is used as evidence that torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred. Deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence, is prohibited at all times.’525 12. The Human Rights Committee has stated that ‘While reservations to particular clauses of article 14 may be acceptable, a general reservation to the right to a fair trial would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant’.526 D. The presumption of innocence 13. A fundamental principle of the right to fair trial is the right of every person charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in accordance with the law after a fair trial.527 This right is absolute even during times of emergency.528 14. This right applies from when a detainee is suspected of or charged with a criminal offence,529 right through until a conviction is confirmed following a final appeal. It applies to all public officials, including prosecutors and police.530 The presumption of innocence can be infringed by, for example, unqualified public statements by the police or prosecution which refer to an individual as the 525 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.32, CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para 6. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.32, CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para 5. See also its General Comment, No. 24 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). 527 Article 11 of the UDHR, Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, Article 16 Arab Charter. Article 14, Palestinian Basic Law. 528 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.32, CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), paras 6, 11 and 16. 529 UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, GA, 9 December 1988, principle 36(1). 530 Human Rights Committee General Comment No.13, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 135 (2003), para. 7. The presumption of innocence is not, however, considered to be violated if the authorities inform the public about criminal investigations and in doing so name a suspect, or state that a suspect has been arrested or has confessed, provided there is no declaration that the person is guilty: Krause v. Switzerland 6 October 1983, and Worm v Austria, 29 August 1997. 526 100