9. Nevertheless the concept of ‘indirect’ discrimination has its limits. The concept of indirect discrimination, though prohibiting conditions that disadvantage certain groups, does not require positive measures to ensure that any existing disadvantage or difference is overcome or accommodated. 10. Additionally the ‘indirect discrimination’ model only prohibits ‘unjustified’ discriminatory conditions. So where individuals claimed to have been discriminated against because they were retired and the government’s decision to abolish some benefits disproportionately affected them, the Human Rights Committee held that as this did not disproportionately affect those of a particular race or colour and the abolition was based on reasonable and objective grounds, no violation occurred.124 Burden of proof 11. It is generally for the applicant to show that they have been treated differently from a person in a comparable situation.125 Once the applicant has shown a prima facie case, the burden will shift to the State to justify the discrimination.126 Using Positive Action to Tackle Entrenched Discrimination 12. An obligation to bring about change by the imposition of a positive duty so as to tackle structural disadvantage goes further towards securing substantive equality, and this is recognised in a number of international and regional human rights treaties.127 Such an approach is sometimes considered controversial because of the assumption that positive duties, or affirmative action, violate conventional principles of equality. Yet it does represent the high point in the protection against discrimination.128 Positive action measures may not amount to unjustified discrimination and must therefore be temporary, reasonable, objective and proportionate.129 13. States also have obligations in relation to specific groups. These include the duty to:  eliminate stereotypical roles for men and women as well as gender-based violence;130 124 Human Rights Committee, Communication 998/2001, Althammer v Austria, 22 September 2013; European Court, Marckx v Belgium, 13 June 1979. 125 European Court, Fredin v Sweden, 18 Feb 1991. 126 Human Rights Committee, Communication 208/1986, Bhinder Singh v Canada, 9 November 1989; Committee Against Torture, Communication 185/2001, Chedi Ben Ahmed Karoui v Sweden, 25 May 2002. European Court, DH and others v Czech Republic, 13 Nov 2007. 127 Human Rights Committee General Comment No.18, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) p.195 (1989), para 10; ICERD, Article 1(4) and Article 2(2); CERD, General Comment No.32, CERD/C/GC/32 (2009); Article 4(1) CEDAW; General Recommendation No.25, CEDAW Committee; ICESCR General Comment No.16, E/C.12/2005/4 (2005), para 15. See also Article 3(3) Arab Charter. 128 See Human Rights Committee, Communication 198/1985, Stalla v Costa v Uruguay, 9 July 1987 129 CERD, General Comment No.32, CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), paras 16 and 21. CEDAW General Recommendation No.25. 130 CEDAW, Articles 2(f), 5 and 16(e) and CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.19,, 11th Session (1992), para 24. 42