4.13 On article 14, paragraph 1, the State party, referring to a number of provisions of its Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure, stresses that, during the proceedings of the author's case, principles such as the independence of the judiciary, equality before the law, the right to legal counsel, or the publicity of the trial, were operating and in conformity with the requirements of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. submit cassation motions to the Supreme Court. According to article 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the term for such application was one year. 4.7 In the present case, the author could have made an application for cassation motion until 4 May 1995, one year after the sentence came into force, but no such application was made. 4.8 The application for cassation motion of the author's counsel was made on 28 September 1995 when the term of one year had already expired. The Chairman of the Division of Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court therefore decided on 8 December 1995 that, in accordance with article 3, paragraph 6, of the Law of 15 June 1994, there was no ground for submission of the cassation motion. The same reasoning holds true with respect to the application made by counsel on 2 April 1996. 4.14 With respect to the other factual circumstances of the case, the State party states that it is neither able to evaluate the evidence of the criminal case nor to assess their weight among the complexity of evidence contained in this case, which is a discretionary right belonging to the courts. 4.15 The State party is thus of the opinion that the allegations concerning a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant are incompatible with the provision of the Covenant, and this part of the communication should therefore be declared inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 4.9 The State party also wishes to stress that the author had the right to ask for "restitution of the term for the cassation motion" but did not use it. 4.16 The State party draws the attention of the Committee to the provisions of its Code of Criminal Procedure according to which it is forbidden to strive to obtain testimonies of the accused or of other persons taking part in the criminal proceedings using violence, threatening or by any other illegal methods. 4.10 In conclusion, when the sentence was pronounced on 4 May 1994, there was, under the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force, no possibility of a cassation motion. However, between the sentence becoming executory and 1 January 1995, the author and his counsel had the right to request from the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor-General or their deputies that they submit a "supervisory protest". Moreover, between 1 July 1994, the entry into force of the law of 15 June 1994, and 4 May 1995, the author and his counsel had the right to request from the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Chairpersons of the county courts or the chairpersons of the division of criminal cases of the above courts that they submit a cassation motion. None of these possibilities were used by the author. The applications of author's counsel to submit a cassation motion of 28 September 1995 and 2 April 1996 were submitted outside the time limit of one year. 4.17 The State party notes that despite allegations of such illegal actions, the author has not used his right under article 52 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal actions and decisions of the interrogator, investigator, prosecutor or the court. Moreover, the author could have submitted these facts to the prosecutor who had then a duty to investigate officially. 4.18 The State party also notes that the testimony given by the author during the trial was not followed by a concrete request addressed to the Court pursuant to article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court did not, therefore, take a decision in this regard. Moreover, all testimonies of the accused during the trial have the value of evidence and are assessed by the court when taking its decision. 4.11 With respect to article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, the State party notes that the Supreme Court was the highest judicial instance of the State party at the time of the judgement in the present case but that the right of the author to request for a "supervisory protest" between 4 May 1994 and 1 January 1995 and to request a cassation motion between 1 July 1994 and 4 May 1995 should be considered as a review within the meaning of this provision. 4.19 The State party is thus of the opinion that the author did not exhaust domestic remedies in this respect and that this part of the communication should be declared inadmissible. Author’s comments 5.1 By submission of 30 June 1999, the author made his comments on the State party's submission. 4.12 As a result, the author did not exhaust domestic remedies and this part of the communication should be declared inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (b) of the Optional Protocol. 5.2 With regard to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 5, the author considers that the right to address the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor-General or their deputies with 103