condition, it is obvious that certain details might have been forgotten or badly explained and that, moreover, six months after his arrival he had needed to be hospitalized for three weeks. 5.2 The complainant then contests the arguments of the Federal Office for Refugees casting doubt on his flight from Colombo, stating that he had called on the services of a trafficker precisely to avoid police and customs controls at Colombo airport. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 6.1 Before considering a complaint, the Committee against Torture must decide whether or not it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. In this case, the Committee also notes that all domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the State party has not contested admissibility. It therefore finds the complaint admissible. Since both the State party and the complainant have provided observations on the merits of the complaint, the Committee proceeds with the consideration of the merits. 6.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the expulsion of the complainant to Sri Lanka would violate the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or return a person to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 6.3 The Committee must decide, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 1, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to Sri Lanka. In reaching this decision, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim of the determination, however, is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would be returned. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country does not by itself constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon returning to that country. There must be other grounds indicating that he or she would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.