CCPR/C/114/D/2395/2014 2.10 On 4 February 2010, the Appeal Court took detailed note of the evidence adduced in the trial and confirmed the author ’s criminal liability for the crime of homicide under especially aggravated circumstances in repeated offences. The Court noted that Act No. 15848 did not grant an amnesty but merely regulated the lapse of criminal action by the State, which did not apply ipso jure, but required a determination on the part of the executive branch. As to the calculation of the period of limitation for the offence of homicide, the Court found that 1 March 1985 should be taken as the start date, since before then the Public Prosecution Service, as the body authorized to bring criminal proceedings, had been unable to do so freely and, in practice, these facts could not have been investigated under the regime that governed the State party between 1973 and 1985. In this regard, the Court referred to the legal provisions introduced by that regime restricting the authority of the judiciary and, among other measures, declaring all judges ad interim and subject to removal by the executive branch. It also found that the extension of the period of limitation by one third was applicable under article 123 of the Criminal Code. 2.11 The author filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court and repeated his claims. On 6 May 2011, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in cassation. The author submits that domestic remedies have thereby been exhausted. 2.12 On 27 October 2011, the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives adopted Act No. 18831, restoring the State’s full punitive powers “in respect of criminal offences committed in the context of State terrorism up to 1 March 1985 and covered by article 1 of Act No. 15848”. It also established that “no procedural period of limitation or expiry shall apply between 22 December 1986 and the entry into force of the Act, in respect of offences covered by article 1 of the Act”, and that these offences constituted “crimes against humanity in accordance with international treaties ” to which the State was a party. 2.13 In addition, the author attempted several remedies and appeals, asking to serve the sentence imposed by Court No. 19 in the form of house arrest, in accordance with articles 131 and 326 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, owing to his advanced age and frail health. The author claimed that he was at risk of sudden death and that conditions in prison were poor and medical attention could not be provided in a prompt and timely manner. On 4 March 2013, Trial Court No. 19 rejected the au thor’s request for house arrest and ordered him to continue serving his sentence in Prison No. 8, Domingo Arena. The Court pointed out that the detention centre had sufficient facilities to meet the author ’s needs and that arrangements had been made so that, in the event of an emergency, he would be quickly moved to hospital, as had in fact happened when he was taken to the Military Hospital, where he had stayed from 30 August to 6 November and on 12 and 30 November 2012, and again between 3 December 2012 and 4 March 2013; and that, notwithstanding his advanced age and multiple ailments, according to a supplementary report by a forensic doctor, his repeated syncopal episodes had occurred not only in the prison , but also in the hospital and were thus unrelated to the place of detention. The complaint 3.1 The author claims to be the victim of violations by the State party of articles 2, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15 and 26 of the Covenant. 3.2 The author refers to article 1 of Act No. 15848, which is applicable to his case and which stipulates that “the exercise of punitive power has expired”. He asserts that his rights under the Covenant were violated because the proceedings brought by the courts of the State party failed to observe the basic principles of criminal law, such as the applicability of the statute of limitations to criminal offences, the non -retroactivity of criminal law and the notions of res judicata and ne bis in idem. In his case, the GE.15-13662 5/13