CDL-AD(2011)034 -6- importance of the said issue for the effective functioning of the Ombudsman institution. The Law does not even refer to the Constitution, which provides that the Human Rights Protector may be dismissed by Parliament by a majority vote of the total number of members of Parliament. The Protector whose dismissal is envisaged should have been granted the opportunity to express his or her views at the session of Parliament prior to the vote on the dismissal. 25. It is very important to reaffirm again to ensure the independence of the Human Rights Protector that he or she should not be dismissed by a simple majority as foreseen in the Constitution, but by a qualified majority of the members of Parliament. Such a majority would be desirable in order to guarantee that the Protector cannot be removed from office because of his or her acts being disapproved by the governmental majority on Parliament. The Constitution should be amended in this sense. 26. Article 15(2) 2 should have specified that the deprivation of legal capacity shall require the decision of a medical experts’ panel. Dismissal for the grounds laid down in Art. 15(2) 3)-4), which states that the Protector or Deputy shall be dismissed, if he or she “becomes a member of a political organisation” or “is performing other public function or professionally is engaged in other activity”, can be considered a too severe sanction, at least without the requirement of a prior warning. It would have been advisable to provide them also with the opportunity to remove that incompatibility by giving up on the other activity. Article 23 27. This article enumerates certain state representatives and officials who are obliged to receive the Human Rights Protector at his or her request, without delay. This provision should have been extended to make it clear that not only those officials but also any state or local official should have such an obligation. Articles 24-25 28. Article 24 of the Law stipulates that the following powers shall be assigned to the Protector, his or her Deputy and “the employee authorised by the Protector”: 1) to “inspect”, without prior notice, places of deprivation of liberty; 2) to visit, without prior notification and permission, persons deprived of their liberty; and 3) to talk in private to persons deprived of their liberty as well as to other persons who may provide relevant information. 29. These powers do not fully comply with the requirements laid down in the Optional Protocol of the Convention Against Torture in relation to the national preventive mechanisms (Art. 17-23). In particular, the following important elements should have been included in the Law: 1) the power of the National Prevention Mechanism (NPM) to carry out regular visits to all places where persons are or may be deprived of their liberty (it should be borne in mind that preventive regular visits are a fundamental feature of NPMs); 2) the right of the members of the NPM to be granted access to all relevant information concerning, in particular, the number of detainees and places of detention, the treatment of detainees and their conditions of detention; 3) a legal guarantee that the persons who have cooperated with the office of the Protector will not suffer any retaliation; 4) the right of the Protector to receive responses from the authorities to the recommendations issued by him or her as an NPM and the obligation of the competent State authorities to enter into a dialogue with the Protector on possible implementation measures.