CCPR/C/118/D/2317/2013 constitute a violation of article 9.a It is true that the cases in which the Committee has had to deal with such claims have concerned pretrial detention, whereas, in the present case, the author was detained incommunicado after being tried and sentenced to imprisonment. Yet it does not follow therefrom that there is no violation of article 9: any incommunicado detention, outside the reach of law, constitutes arbitrary detention within the meaning of the second sentence of article 9 (1). It also constitutes a violation of the right to security of person recognized in the first sentence of article 9 (1). 6. Moreover, any incommunicado detention that removes a person from the protection of the law violates article 16, since it constitutes a denial of the victim’s right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Certainly, the author did not raise this claim explicitly, but I believe that the Committee could have done so of its own motion and found a violation, given the importance of the right in question and its inviolable nature. b a b 12 See general comment No. 35 (2014) on article 9 (liberty and security of person), para. 35. See also, inter alia, communication No. 1196/2003, Boucherf v. Algeria, Views adopted on 30 March 2006, para. 9.5; communication No. 1297/2004, Medjnoune v. Algeria, Views adopted on 14 July 2006, para. 8.7; and communication No. 2297/2013, Chani v. Algeria, Views adopted on 11 March 2016, para. 7.5. See the individual (concurring) opinion by Mr. Olivier de Frouville, Mr. Yadh Ben Achour, Mr. Mauro Politi and Mr. Víctor Manuel Rodríguez-Rescia contained in the annex to the Committee’s Views in Chani v. Algeria. GE.17-01270