CCPR/C/125/D/2684/2015 4.4 The State party notes the author’s statement that he suffered a brain injury in the intervening period, with his IQ reducing further. As a result, he was found unfit to plead in relation to other convictions (brought against him in 2007). The alteration in the author’s intellectual capacity makes it difficult now to address or test whether the psychiatric assessments of 2004 were correct. The delay is also prejudicial for the author in attaining an effective remedy. 4.5 The State party also submits that the author failed to appeal his conviction and sentence within the statutory limit of 28 days. Instead, two years and eight months after being sentenced, he submitted an application for leave to appeal out of time, which was rejected by the High Court on 17 March 2009. Had the author pursued his right to appeal within 28 days of his sentence, he would have had a hearing of the merits of his appeal in the High Court. If the appeal was unsuccessful, he could have appealed further to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Instead, having failed to lodge his application for an appeal in a timely manner, the author has limited the remedies available to him to the decision of the High Court regarding his application for leave to appeal out of time. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 On 23 February 2016, the author replied to the State party’s observations. He claims that he failed to appeal his conviction in 2004 simply because he lacked the intellectual capacity to do so. He alleges that the State party has failed to explain how a man with an intellectual disability is supposed to appeal within the time limit – something he can only do once he has understood the sentencing process, and the right of appeal. 5.2 The author argues that he did exhaust domestic remedies, by seeking leave to appeal out of time to the High Court, and by submitting three different writs of habeas corpus, two of which he appealed. He also claims that the approach of the State party is discriminatory in criminal proceedings – in comparison to civil cases, which allow extensions to the time period in which intellectually disabled persons can bring lawsuits. He claims that such discrimination violates articles 14 (1) and 26 of the Covenant, by not providing reasonable accommodation as regards time.4 5.3 The author argues that the approach of the State party, if accepted, would have farreaching effects for anyone needing to exhaust domestic remedies. He also claims that he had to rely entirely on his present counsel to act in many of the domestic hearings, and concerning the present communication, on a pro bono basis. 5.4 On the matter of the delay in submitting the communication to the Committee, the author, in essence, claims that his intellectual disability, plus his subsequent beatings and brain injury, were sufficient explanation for such delay. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee notes the State party’s observation that the communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission under article 3 of the Optional Protocol because the author submitted his complaint to the Committee five years after the final court decision in his case and has failed to substantiate the reasons for such delay. The Committee notes the author’s argument that his intellectual disability, which worsened after a brain injury, was sufficient reason for the delay. The Committee recalls that there are no 4 The author refers to articles 2, 5 and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to define “reasonable accommodation”. 5