CCPR/C/125/D/2684/2015 fixed time limits for the submission of communications under the Optional Protocol and that mere delay in submission does not in and of itself entail abuse of the right of submission. However, in certain circumstances, the Committee expects a reasonable explanation justifying a delay. 5 In addition, according to rule 96 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedures, “a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission, when it is submitted after 5 years from the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication, or, where applicable, after 3 years from the conclusion of another procedure of international investigation or settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay taking into account all the circumstances of the communication”.6 6.4 The State party submits that the final court decision in the author’s case was the decision of the High Court dated 14 June 2010. It also notes that the author submitted his communication to the Committee on 2 June 2015. The Committee observes that, stricto sensu, the author submitted his complaint to the Committee some two weeks before the five-year deadline established in rule 96 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. The Committee thus considers that, accordingly, there has been no abuse of the right of submission in the present case. 6.5 The Committee notes the State party’s observation that the author failed to exhaust domestic remedies because he did not submit an appeal against his conviction and sentencing within the statutory limit of 28 days. The Committee also notes the author’s counterargument that he missed the deadline for appeal because of his intellectual disability, and that by applying for leave to appeal out of time to the High Court, as well as by submitting the habeas corpus applications, he did exhaust domestic remedies. 6.6 While considering whether domestic remedies have been exhausted, the Committee recalls that the function of the exhaustion requirement under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol is to provide the State party itself with the opportunity to remedy the violation suffered by an individual.7 In the present case, the author, although represented by counsel in the District Court, missed a 28-day deadline for submitting an appeal to the High Court. According to the State party, such appeal, if unsuccessful, could have been made to higher courts, that is, the Court of Appeal and even the Supreme Court. Having missed the possibility for ordinary appeal, the author applied for leave to appeal out of time in 2007, two years and eight months after his actual conviction. The refusal by the High Court to grant leave to appeal could only be appealed to the Court of Appeal, which the author did, but he withdrew the appeal, having agreed with the arguments of the respondent about the lack of jurisdiction. It is clear to the Committee that by missing the ordinary appeal option, the author did not give a chance to all the competent courts to consider his grievances. 6.7 In regard to the author’s allegation that his applications for habeas corpus should be considered as an indication of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Committee notes that both appeals submitted to the Court of Appeal were denied because the appropriate procedure for addressing the author’s claims was the ordinary appeal procedure, and not applications for a writ of habeas corpus. 6.8 The Committee finds the author’s argument that he missed the statutory time limit for appeal because of his intellectual disability unconvincing, especially taking into consideration that he was represented by professional counsel during the District Court hearing, and that he has not advanced any complaints before the Committee concerning the services provided to him by that counsel. The Committee notes that the author has pleaded guilty and might not have had an intention to appeal. In any case, there is nothing on file to explain why the author missed the opportunity to appeal in 2004 and decided to take such an opportunity in 2007. 6.9 The Committee also notes the author’s argument that since he has an intellectual disability, he could not be expected to appeal within the time limit – which is something he could only do once he had understood the sentencing process, and the right of appeal. In this regard, the Committee notes that according to the information available to it on file, 5 6 7 6 See Gobin v. Mauritius (CCPR/C/72/D/787/1997), para. 6.3. The rule applies to communications received by the Committee as of 1 January 2012. See Celal v. Greece (CCPR/C/82/D/1235/2003), para. 6.3.