BEWARE THE GIFT OF POISON FRUIT for information or intelligence leads to some serious questions about the reliability of the underlying information, and the manner in which it is collected, shared and used. Ultimately, this report, and the expert meeting on which it was based, seeks to find some answers to the following dilemma, which has been returned to repeatedly in recent years as more allegations of executive abuses have been made public: How should authorities deal with information which has allegedly been extracted under torture or other forms of ill-treatment, or likely be used to commit torture or other ill-treatment if shared, but which is potentially relevant to the work of executive agencies and the courts? State actors have traditionally drawn inspiration and guidance for their work from rules adopted at the national and international level. However, anti-torture laws at the domestic level rarely direct themselves to the work of security and intelligence actors, and few international rules may be invoked which address the issues with enough precision to be used in practice. Consequently, State actors admit struggling to understand the acceptable limits of their executive action. In light of this perceived lacuna of legal standards, the time is now ripe to examine the ethics and law applying to the executive use of information obtained by torture, or the sharing of information which would likely lead to torture overseas. 3 States have preferred not to subject the work of their intelligence and security agencies to scrutiny or international oversight, and unlike law enforcement actors, there are no standards which offer advice or guidance for their work.4 The lack of guidance may lead to the erroneous conclusion that such intelligence cooperation and sharing of information between executive agencies is not subject to international law. 3 4 6 In December 2013, a report summarising the preparatory work of the Detainee Inquiry and highlighting particular themes and issues that might merit more investigation was published, adding further emphasis to the issues at the heart of this analysis. See Report of the Detainee Inquiry, at https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/report-of-the-detainee-inquiry. Consider, in contrast, a number of international soft law instruments for law enforcement officials, prison officials, prosecutors, or judges. See, for instance, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979; or the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.