SHARING INFORMATION WITH STATES THAT TORTURE authorities for the interrogation of a related individual, which served to reinforce Arar as a suspect in the eyes of Syrian authorities. In the case of Mahar Arar, it is clear that the information shared by the Canadians with the US, in which Arar and his wife were labelled as extremist Islamists with links to Al-Qaeda, led directly to the unlawful detention and torture of Arar in Syria. The resulting flawed intelligence from interrogations with Arar flowed back to Canada, strengthening their conviction that he was the terrorist they sought. The questions sent from Canada led the Syrian Military Intelligence to believe a link between Arar and another suspect, Abdullah Almalki, and the self-fulfilling process of interrogation, newly intensified, began again. At their review by the Committee against Torture, the Canadians asserted that 22 of 23 recommendations made in the Arar Commission report had been implemented, including the introduction of a number of additional safeguards. However, one of the most urgent, an oversight body to monitor the work of the security services, has not been set up, hence making it impossible to say whether safeguards are being applied in practice. From these examples, we can identify two broad groups of cases. Some cases demonstrate examples of torture and other forms of ill-treatment carried out as a result information shared with foreign executive agencies (outgoing information). The victims of such treatment are detained and or interrogated on the basis of the information shared with the foreign agencies, and we must consider whether and to what extent sharing information with the foreign agency caused any resulting abuses. Other examples reveal examples of torture carried out to obtain information (which may or may not be with the complicity of domestic agencies), which is then shared with domestic agencies (inbound information). In these cases, we must ask whether reliance on such tainted information can serve to encourage further abuse. It is important to remember that the issues highlighted above are not limited to intelligence sharing across borders. Similar issues may present themselves when agencies share information within just one State. Frequently, information received from a foreign 15