CAT/C/62/D/721/2015 complainant’s arguments that the State party’s analysis of the claim under article 16 is incorrect; that the prohibition on refoulement also covers ill-treatment; that his removal per se would constitute a violation of article 16, given his particular circumstances, notably the fact that he is suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder; and that provision of the specialized medical treatment he is currently receiving in Switzerland would by no means be guaranteed if he were removed to Bulgaria. In this regard, the Committee considers that the complainant is relying on information of a general nature, without presenting specific evidence to support his allegations. In these circumstances, and in the absence of other pertinent information on file, the Committee concludes that the complainant has failed to sufficiently substantiate his claim under article 16 for the purpose of admissibility. 6.5 The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the complainant raise substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention, and that those arguments should be dealt with on the merits. Accordingly, as the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication admissible under article 3 of the Convention. Consideration of the merits 7.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 7.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the complainant to Bulgaria would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would risk being subjected to torture. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Bulgaria. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The Committee recalls that the aim of that determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would personally be at a foreseeable and real risk of being tortured in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would personally be at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture given his or her specific circumstances. 31 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1, wherein it states that the existence of a risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to be shown to be highly probable, 32 the Committee recalls that the burden of proof normally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she is at foreseeable, real and personal risk.33 The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with this general comment, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned but, at the same time, it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, 31 32 33 12 See, for example, E.K.W. v. Finland (CAT/C/54/D/490/2012), para. 9.3. See general comment No. 1, para. 6. Ibid. See also A.R. v. Netherlands (CAT/C/31/D/203/2002), para. 7.3; Kalonzo v. Canada (CAT/C/48/D/343/2008) para. 9.3; X v. Denmark (CAT/C/53/D/458/2011), para. 9.3; and W.G.D. v. Canada (CAT/C/53/D/520/2012), para. 8.4. GE.18-04727