A/HRC/37/50 agreements establish, in advance, a procedure allowing the expulsion of migrants without an individualized risk assessment based on the circumstances ruling at the time. Already by definition, therefore, readmission agreements circumvent migrants' due process rights and fall short of the procedural precautions States must take to ensure returnees will not be exposed to torture or ill-treatment. Moreover, in practice, States often make unrealistic blanket assessments, such as automatically equating democratic countries with "safe" countries, or conclude readmission agreements with States known to practice chain refoulement, or even torture and ill-treatment. In sum, the Special Rapporteur considers that, in the absence of an individualized risk assessment for each concerned migrant, deportation decisions taken on the basis of readmission agreements amount to collective expulsions incompatible with the procedural requirements of the prohibition of refoulement. 3. Diplomatic assurances 47. Diplomatic assurances are bilateral policy instruments by which a deporting State obtains assurances from the receiving State that the deported persons will not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment or transferred to another country where they would risk such abuse. Diplomatic assurances generally take the form of non-binding Memoranda of Understanding. Even where such assurances are binding, and even where they provide the deporting State with monitoring and verification rights, the principal interest of the deporting State normally is to continue deportations in the future, which makes any uncovering of violations and enforcement action extremely unlikely. In practice, the enforceability or compulsive force of diplomatic assurances depends entirely on the mutual self-interests of the involved States in light of their specific political, economic or military relations. 48. Diplomatic assurances have been, and continue to be, widely criticized for being used as a loophole undermining the principle of non-refoulement, including by this mandate,77 the UN Committee against Torture78 and civil society, 79 and are highly questionable from both legal and policy perspectives. First, diplomatic assurances cannot absolve the deporting State from conducting a rigorous and individualized risk assessment. Such proceedings must take into account that, in practice, diplomatic assurances are used predominantly where the deporting State already has serious concern that the receiving State will not respect the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, which is precisely the decisive criterion for absolutely prohibiting any expulsion to that State. Properly understood, therefore, the intended use of diplomatic assurances in a particular case normally militates against the permissibility of that expulsion and makes it almost impossible for the deporting State to conclusively disprove a "real risk" of torture or ill-treatment. 49. Second, even if diplomatic assurances were to be faithfully implemented by the receiving State, they express the expectation that the receiving State will only selectively comply with the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and signal the deporting State's complacency in this respect, thus severely jeopardizing one of the most fundamental norms of the international ordre public and squarely contradicting the principles and purposes of the United Nations. At best, this practice could result in a two-tier system of protection against torture and ill-treatment, under which only a select few would benefit from "enhanced" de facto protection under diplomatic assurances governed by political, economic or military rationales, whereas the protection of the great majority under applicable treaty law and jus cogens would become increasingly optional, thus severely weakening the universal prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and, ultimately, the rule of law. 50. In sum, the Special Rapporteur expresses grave alarm at the implicit complacency and acquiescence expressed by the use of diplomatic assurances for merely selective compliance with the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. Moreover, where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture or illtreatment upon return, diplomatic assurances, even in conjunction with post-return 77 78 79 14 E.g. A/70/303, §69; A/76/316, §51. E.g. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, §13.4. CAT, GC_No.4_(2017)_Art.3, §20. E.g. Amnesty International, "Dangerous_Deals:_Europe’s_reliance_on_“diplomatic_assurances” _against_torture" (12.04.2010); Human Rights Watch, "Still_at_Risk: _Diplomatic_Assurances_No_Safeguard_Against_Torture" (15.04.2005).