CAT/C/39/2 page 56 238. The general rule of interpretation described above is uncontrovertibly recognized as the expression of common international law, including by the International Court of Justice.43 In fact, already in 1931 the Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that “It is a fundamental rule of interpretation that words must be given the ordinary meaning which they bear in their context unless such an interpretation leads to unreasonable or absurd results.”44 239. The ICJ has been developing important jurisprudence on the respect to the general interpretation rule. Already at the Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly to admit a State to the United Nations, it stated that “(...) the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur” (...) [I]f the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these words.”45 The Hague Court also emphasized that the interpretation cannot revise treaties or read into them what they do not contain expressly or by necessary implication.46 240. It should be mentioned, in particular, that the general rule of interpretation can have a fundamental role in the protection of human rights, as in the recognition, by the International Court of Justice, of the individual right to be informed about the rights to consular assistance provided for in article 36 1.b of the Vienna Convention on Consular relations and, more recently, in the case on the application of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 43 Cf., for instance, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion. 09 July 2004. para. 94. Territorial Dispute (Lybian Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, pp. 21-22, para. 41.Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 812, para. 23; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 18, para. 33; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1059, para. 18, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 645, para. 37. 44 “PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, Customs Unions between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, Series A/B, Nº 41, 60. 45 International Court of Justice. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations. Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports (1950), p. 8. 46 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 159; South-West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, pp. 39, 48.