A/HRC/46/26 frequently seized by the mandate failed to respond and, thus, declined to provide their views with regard to potential challenges arising in their cooperation with the mandate holder. 2. National procedures 44. In response to the first question of the questionnaire, some States provided general information on training and legislative, institutional and other measures taken at the national level for the prevention and investigation of torture and ill-treatment, including for the ratification and implementation of the Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Optional Protocol to the Convention and the creation of a national preventive mechanism. 45. Only 17 States provided information specifically on the national procedures put in place to process and respond to allegations of torture and ill-treatment transmitted by the Special Rapporteur. Those procedures included the good practice of establishing a specialized national mechanism (or division within the concerned ministry), which assumes the responsibility of coordinating responses to mandate holders and following up on recommendations made by all United Nations human rights mechanisms, which facilitates cooperation with mandate holders, could assist the State in analysing and detecting systematic violations of human rights, and recommends reforms at the national level. 46. Furthermore, 10 States provided brief information on the procedures followed to assess and respond to country visit requests by the Special Rapporteur. Overall, 14 States indicated having extended standing invitation to all special procedure mandate holders. Fourteen States did not provide any information on the processing of country visit requests by the Special Rapporteur. 47. Given the small number of responses, it was unfortunately not possible to establish a representative overview of the procedures used by States to process official communications and country visit requests transmitted by the mandate holder. 3. Self-evaluation 48. The second and third questions of the questionnaire invited States to self-evaluate their cooperation with the mandate holder in response to official communications and country visit requests transmitted over the past four years. In response, 13 States considered their interaction with the mandate to be “fully cooperative” or otherwise indicated that they were open to constructive dialogue and cooperation. Three of these States had not received any communication from the Special Rapporteur. Only one State described interaction as partially cooperative due to the Government’s inability to respond to one of the communications received. Furthermore, six States indicated that they had not received any communications from the Special Rapporteur although, according to official records, one or several communications had been transmitted to them during the period under review. 49. Given the small number of responses, it was unfortunately not possible to obtain a representative understanding of how and based on which criteria States Members of the United Nations self-evaluate their cooperation with the mandate holder in response to official communications and requests for a country visit. 4. State recommendations and requests 50. The fourth question of the questionnaire invited States to submit recommendations and requests with a view to improving their current cooperation and dialogue with the mandate holder. In response, five States provided recommendations or reported challenges to cooperation with the mandate holder. 51. The challenges posed reported included the restricted timeline of 60 days within which Governments are expected to respond to official communications, which in some cases was not sufficient to allow for the national consultations and investigations that would be required to provide a detailed and satisfactory response. Other challenges reported included lack of resources to investigate all allegations, in particular given the number of communications received by some Governments and the perceived overlap of the mandate of the Special 9