62 GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON TORTURE: Law and Practice The ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR, respectively) have referred to the definition of torture under the Convention against Torture for use in their jurisdic­ tions. These courts have been clear in finding acts of State agents to be torture.29 Human rights courts, on the other hand, initially required a clear nexus between rape and a State agent in order for the crime to rise to the level of torture.30 In subsequent rulings, the tribunals found that acts committed by private persons may constitute torture.31 These findings have made it easier to define violence against women as torture.32 The ad hoc tribunals were the first to recognize sexual violence and rape as forms of torture in the context of war crimes.33 In the 1998 Akayesu case, the ICTR found that rape constituted torture in a judgment that would serve as a basis for subsequent rulings by the same court as well as by the ICTY. The ICTR wrote that “like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degra­ dation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of the person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”34 The ICTY, too, has made many contributions to the extensive jurisprudence recognizing rape as torture. In the Delalic case, commanders of a prison camp were convicted of rape as torture for rapes they committed as well as for having failed to prevent soldiers under their command from committing rapes.35 In the Furundzija case, the ICTY found the defendant guilty of rape as torture as a co-perpetrator for having allowed the rape of a female detainee who was being interrogated in his presence.36 In addition to establishing jurisprudence that makes it clear that rape may constitute torture, the ICTY also established that other acts of sexual violence and gender-based violence may also rise to the threshold of serious physical or mental harm required in order to find torture, as in the following cases: • Kvocka et al. The Tribunal found that fondling of sex organs and the threat of rape consti­ tuted torture. • Furundzija. The Tribunal ruled that being required to witness serious sexual assaults on fam­ ily members or acquaintances constituted torture. • Martic. The Tribunal found that forced mutual masturbation constituted a form of torture. 29 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu: case number ICTR-96-4-T. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, September 2, 1998. 30 Aydın v. Turkey, Application No. 57/1996/676/866, Judgment of September 25, 1997. Vid: LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security. Tackling Violence against Women http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/landmark­ cases/a-z-of-cases/aydin-v-turkey/ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Raquel Martín de Mejía v. Peru. Report No. 5/96. Judgment of March 1, 1996. Chapter III. Section III-Analysis. Part a). (online) http:// www.cidh.org/annualrep/95span/cap.III.peru10.970b.htm. Vid: LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security. Tackling Violence against Women, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/meija-v-peru/. 31 Opuz v. Turkey, Application No. 33401/02, Judgment of June 9, 2009. Vid: LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security. Tackling Violence against Women. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/ opuz-v-turkey/. 32 McGlynn, C. Rape as “Torture”? Catharine MacKinnon and Questions of Feminist Strategy. Feminist Legal Studies 16(1): 71-85. p. 76 (2008). 33 Gaer Felice, op. cit., p. 294-295. 34 Akayesu, op. cit., paras. 597-598. 35 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, et al.: case number IT-96-21. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, November 16, 1998, paras. 944 and 965. 36 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija: case number IT-95-17/1-T. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, December 10, 1998, paras. 269, 273, and 275.