Teresa Fernández Paredes 77 framework and enforcing it, preventing risk factors, ensuring that victims of violence can obtain an effective response from public agencies and authorities, and ensuring that public officials and persons responsible for receiving reports have the capacity and the sensitivity to understand the seriousness of the phenomenon of violence against women.113 In the abovementioned judgments in the cases of Fernández Ortega and Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, the IACHR Court laid out the minimum guiding principles that must be included in any investiga­ tion of sexual violence, based on standards of international law provided under instruments such as the Istanbul Protocol and the medico-legal guidelines.114 In its more recent judgment in the case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, the Court reiterated that “the obligation to investigate has a wider scope when dealing with the case of a woman who is killed or ill-treated or whose personal liberty is affected within the framework of a general context of violence against women. In this scenario, State authorities have the obligation to officially inves­ tigate any possibility of gender-based discrimination in an act of violence committed against a woman, particularly when there are specific indications of sexual violence of any kind or evidence of brutality (such as mutilation), or when the act occurs in a context of a pattern of violence against women in a particular country or region. The investigation of such crimes must also include a gen­ der perspective and be performed by officials trained in similar cases and in assistance for victims of discrimination and gender-based violence.”115 Similarly, in the case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, the Court indicated that “when there are indi­ cations or specific suspicions of gender-based violence, the failure by authorities to investigate the possible discriminatory motives for an act of violence against women may itself constitute a form of gender-based discrimination.”116 In the case of J. v. Peru, the Court found that “Regarding the inexistence of the international obligation to investigate sexual ‘touching’ at the time of the events, the Court reiterates its consis­ tent case law concerning the obligation to investigate possible acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”117 In the same case, the Court wrote that “with regard to the impediment to opening an investi­ gation ex officio because the offense of rape was subject to private right of action, the Court repeats that, when there is a well-founded reason to believe that an act of torture or ill-treatment has been Cotton Field, op. cit., para. 258. The standards are as follows: “i) the victim’s statement should be taken in a safe and comfortable environment, providing privacy and inspiring confidence; ii) the victim’s statement should be recorded to avoid the need to repeat it, or to limit this to the strictly necessary; iii) the victim should be provided with medical, psychological and hygienic treatment, both on an emergency basis, and continuously if required, under a protocol for such attention aimed at reducing the consequences of the rape; iv) a complete and detailed medical and psychological examination should be made immediately by appropriate trained personnel, of the sex preferred by the victim insofar as this is possible, and the victim should be informed that she can be accompanied by a person of confidence if she so wishes; v) the investigative measures should be coordinated and documented and the evidence handled with care, including taking sufficient samples and performing all possible tests to determine the possible perpetrator of the act, and obtaining other evidence such as the victim’s clothes, immediate examination of the scene of the incident, and the proper chain of custody of the evidence, and vi) access to advisory services or, if applicable, free legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings should be provided.” Fernández Ortega, para. 194; Rosendo Cantú, para. 178. 115 IACHR Court. Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala: Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 19, 2015. Ibid. 116 IACHR Court. Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014, para. 221. 117 IACHR Court. Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013, para. 348. 113 114