CCPR/C/128/D/3032/2017 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee notes the author’s claim that he has exhausted all effective domestic remedies available to him. In the absence of any objection by the State party in that connection, the Committee considers that it is not precluded from examining the communication under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 6.4 Notwithstanding the State party’s contention that article 18 does not have extraterritorial application, the Committee notes that the author merely invokes article 18 of the Covenant without advancing any arguments to support this claim. Therefore, the Committee considers that this claim is insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.2 6.5 The Committee notes the State party’s challenge to admissibility on the grounds that the author’s claim under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant is unsubstantiated. However, the Committee considers that, for the purposes of admissibility, the author has provided sufficient information in support of this claim that his deportation to Afghanistan would result in a risk of treatment contrary to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, the Committee declares the communication admissible insofar as it raises issues under articles 6 and 7 and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that returning him to Afghanistan would expose him to a real risk of irreparable harm, in violation of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. He claims that in Afghanistan, he would face persecution that is potentially life threatening, owing to his particular vulnerability related to his Christian faith, which has been publicized through social media, and his Hazara ethnicity. These factors are aggravated by the fact that he left Afghanistan at the age of 10 and does not have any family or network in the country, while the security situation is seriously worsening. 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 3 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 4 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.5 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.6 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists, 7 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 The Committee also notes that the author did not maintain his claim in regard to article 18 as it concedes the State party’s claim ratione materiae. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. K v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2. X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. Ibid. See also X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2. Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4; Lin v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See, e.g., K v. Denmark, para. 7.4.