CAT/C/53/D/520/2012 humanitarian and compassionate considerations (H&C application). The State party submits that an H&C application is the remedy best suited to the humanitarian grounds that the complainant had raised in her application for refugee protection, where she referred to her close relationship with her Canadian grandchildren. A successful H&C application would allow her to remain in Canada as a permanent resident. The State party regrets the decisions of the Committee in recent cases such as Kalonzo v. Canada8 and T.I. v. Canada9 in which the Committee considered that H&C applications were not remedies that must be exhausted for the purposes of admissibility. Particularly in the present case, an H&C application is the remedy that is most directly applicable to the nature of her claim and potentially the most effective. Therefore, the State party submits that in the circumstances, the complainant’s failure to make an H&C application renders her communication inadmissible on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 4.11 In the alternative, the State party submits that the complainant’s claim that she will be tortured and killed if she is returned to Ethiopia is manifestly unfounded, on the ground that she has not substantiated her allegations on even a prima facie basis. It submits that the Committee can only consider communications that allege, in a substantiated manner, violations of rights protected by the Convention. 10 4.12 The State party notes that article 3 of the Convention prohibits the expulsion of “a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. The Committee’s general comment on article 3 and its consistent decisions in individual communications state that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable, the burden is upon the complainant to present an arguable case establishing that she runs a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk of torture.11 The State party submits that a consideration of those factors leads to the conclusion that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In particular, her claim is inconsistent, and she has not been tortured in the past. In addition, even though the human rights situation in Ethiopia is problematic, the general human rights situation in a country cannot in itself constitute sufficient grounds for establishing that the complainant would face a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk of torture if returned there. 4.13 The State party further notes that it is not the role of the Committee to weigh evidence or re-assess findings of fact made by domestic courts or tribunals. 12 The complainant’s allegations and supporting evidence in the present communication are simply 8 9 10 11 12 Communication No. 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada, decision adopted on 18 May 2012. Communication No. 333/2007, T.I. v. Canada, decision adopted on 15 November 2010. Communications No. 36/1995, X. v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 8 May 1996, and No. 18/1994, Y. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 17 November 1994. Committee against Torture, general comment No. 1 on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22 of the Convention against Torture, paras. 6–7. Recent views reiterating those principles include communications No. 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada (see footnote 8), para. 9.3; No. 370/2009, E.L. v. Canada, decision adopted on 21 May 2012, para. 8.5; No. 414/2010, N.T.W. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 16 May 2012, para. 7.3; No. 393/2009, E.T. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 23 May 2012, para. 7.3. Communication No. 148/1999, A.K. v. Australia, decision adopted on 5 May 2004, para. 6.4; Human Rights Committee communications No. 215/1986, G.A. van Meurs v. the Netherlands, decision on admissibility adopted on 13 July, 1990, para. 7.1.; No. 485/1991, V.B. v. Trinidad and Tobago, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 26 July, 1993, para. 5.2; No. 949/2000, Keshavjee v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 2 November 2000, para. 4.3; No. 934/2000, G. v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 8 August 2000, paras. 4.2.–4.3; No. 761/1997, Singh v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 29 July 1997, para. 4.2. 7