CRPD/C/25/D/58/2019 with paranoid schizophrenia does not raise a separate issue and should be examined, if admissible, under article 15 of the Convention. Author’s comments on the State party’s submission, including its observations on the merits 7.1 In his submission dated 7 May 2020, the author indicates that his situation has not changed and, in the absence of a residence permit, he still does not have access to the trauma treatment prescribed by his doctor in Sweden. 7.2 As regards the State party’s objection to the admissibility of the complaint on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author contends that there is no legal avenue for him to exhaust domestic remedies regarding his claims under articles 12 and 13 of the Convention other than to claim impediments to the enforcement of his expulsion order and to submit appeals against the first instance decisions. Accordingly, the author argues that he has exhausted all available domestic remedies. 7.3 Regarding the merits of the complaint, the author reiterates that the migration authorities refused to assess the risks associated with his medical condition resulting from his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and instead, relied on their previous assessment that was carried out on the basis of his diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. Relying on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Paposhvili v. Belgium and F.G. v. Sweden, 13 the author claims that he brought forward evidence showing that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if he were to be returned to Afghanistan, and it was for the authorities to verify whether he would have access to adequate medical care. Although the authorities considered the available country information, their conclusion seems arbitrary because nothing in that country information suggests that medical treatment would be available to the author in his extremely vulnerable situation. Furthermore, the State party did not make reference to any country information relating to medical treatment available for paranoid schizophrenia in Afghanistan. The author deems that the State party failed to discharge the reversed burden of proof. The author adds that, in addition to the risk of suicide, he faces risks of inhuman and degrading treatment owing to his disability, which is further exacerbated by the fact that he has no social network in his country of origin. He refers to the judgment in the case of Savran v. Denmark, in which the European Court of Human Rights found that the expulsion to Turkey of the applicant, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, without the Danish authorities having obtained individual assurances, violated article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.14 On the basis of the aforementioned, the author concludes that his rights under articles 10, 12, 13 and 15 of the Convention have been violated by the State party. State party’s additional observations 8. In a note verbale dated 22 December 2020, the State party submitted additional observations, in which it reiterated its position that the Convention should not be applied to non-refoulement cases, especially because there are other mechanisms that can be invoked by petitioners in similar situations. Furthermore, it contests the author’s position that the authorities failed to properly consider the principles as established by the European Court of Human Rights in Paposhvili v. Belgium. Moreover, it notes that, contrary to what the author argues, the judgment in the case of F.G. v. Sweden should not be considered relevant in the present case. 13 14 8 European Court of Human Rights, F.G. v. Sweden, Application No. 43611/11, Judgment of 23 March 2016. European Court of Human Rights, Savran v. Denmark, Application No. 57467/15, Judgment of 1 October 2019.