CAT/C/55/D/512/2012 that the reasons presented by the complainant as to why he has not filed such an application do not excuse his failure to file. 6.2 The State party further considers that the communication is inadmissible because it is manifestly unfounded. It considers that the new evidence the complainant provided to the Committee does not support his allegations of a risk based on fear of harm at the hands of his former in-laws in Pakistan. The new evidence does not address any current risk to the complainant based on his past political affiliation with the PPP in the 1990s. The affidavits submitted by the complainant’s family should be given little or no weight, as the family members have a subjective interest in the complainant remaining in Canada. The documents detailing the court proceedings against the alleged perpetrators in the murders of the complainant’s family members in 2005 and 2009 are procedural in nature and provide no details regarding the substantive proceedings against the accused or their outcome. Furthermore, even if this evidence were accepted, it appears to suggest that the perpetrators are being prosecuted by the State, and that there is no State acquiescence in the alleged risk of harm the complainant fears. Finally, the initial police reports of the murders of the complainant’s family members in 2005 and 2009 provide a greater level of detail about the complainant’s personal history in Pakistan than about the circumstances of the alleged murders. This does not reflect the nature of information likely to be found in a police report, and therefore calls into question the authenticity of the document. A domestic decision maker would be best placed to determine the authenticity of the documents that are purported to be official. 6.3 The State party reiterates its observations on admissibility regarding article 1 of the Convention, and concludes that the communication is wholly without merit. 6.4 In a note verbale dated 12 May 2015, the Committee asked the State party to provide observations on the effectiveness of the PRRA procedure, and on the eligibility of the complainant to file a second PRRA application. In its observations dated 7 July 2015, the State party reiterates that the complainant has been eligible to apply for a second PRRA since 22 December 2011. The State party further argues that, contrary to the complainant’s submission, his complaint before the Committee is not a bar to submitting a new PRRA application, nor is the permission of the Committee required to submit such an application. Rather, individuals like the complainant, whose applications for protection have been rejected but who have remained in Canada since receiving notification of their negative PRRA determination, may make an application for a new PRRA at any time following the negative determination.10 No prior notification is required. While, as the complainant notes, a statutory stay of removal is not available pending the determination of a second or subsequent PRRA, an application may be made to the Federal Court for a judicial stay of removal pending the disposition of the PRRA application. An administrative deferral of removal may also be requested and, if refused, an application for leave and for judicial review of the refusal may be made. If the PRRA application were negatively determined, a judicial stay of removal may be sought pending an application for leave and for judicial review of any negative PRRA determination. An administrative deferral of removal may also be requested in such circumstances. Alternately, if the complainant applied for a new 10 12 The State party notes that section 112 (2) (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act currently renders those who have received a negative PRRA determination ineligible to apply for another PRRA until 12 months have elapsed since that determination. This provision took effect in August 2012. Consequently, had the complainant applied for a second PRRA at any time following notification of his negative PRRA determination on 21 December 2011 and before August 2012, he would not have been subject to the 12-month period of ineligibility to reapply. If the complainant had made an application for a second PRRA after August 2012, the 12-month period of ineligibility would have elapsed as of 18 November 2012, one year from the date of the first PRRA determination.