CAT/C/62/D/672/2015 7 and 10 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in circumstances considerably more extreme than the complainant’s case.7 The State party submits that, in the complainant’s case, the cell confinement was voluntary and the conditions were humane. It notes that conditions of cell confinement in the prison in which the complainant was held were described before the domestic courts by the acting prison manager, who had stated that cell confinement involved keeping prisoners in cells away from their usual units. The cells were essentially the same as the cells in other units in terms of windows, light and fittings, and although books were allowed, television and radio were not. Prisoners could hear but not easily converse with prisoners in nearby cells. Prisoners in cell confinement had access to water and toilet facilities in their cells, and their usual meals were delivered to them during the day. They were allowed one hour a day outside to shower and exercise in the yard. Prisoners were entitled to send and receive mail and continued to have all the other minimum entitlements, except personal (non-statutory) visits or telephone calls. The State party notes that the complainant made no complaints about the conditions of confinement at the time and argues that there is evidence that he was properly looked after and supervised by custodial and health staff during the time he spent in cell confinement. 4.5 The State party notes that the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has noted that prolonged solitary confinement may amount to a breach of article 16 of the Convention, depending on the circumstances of the case. It also notes that the Special Rapporteur found that the assessment of whether solitary confinement amounts to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment should take into consideration all relevant circumstances on a case-bycase basis, including the purpose of the application of solitary confinement, the conditions, length and effects of the treatment and the subjective conditions of each victim that make him or her more or less vulnerable to those effects. 8 The State party submits that, in the circumstances of the case, the 21 days of solitary confinement imposed at the request of the complainant did not amount to a breach of article 16 and that there has consequently been no violation of article 14 of the Convention. 4.6 As regards the complainant’s claim under article 14 of the Convention, the State party notes that the domestic courts have recognized that victims of breaches of the Bill of Rights Act are entitled to an effective remedy, which may include compensation. 9 Any compensation to prisoners is subject to the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act. The State party notes that in the complainant’s case, the Court of Appeal found that he would have been entitled to damages but for his failure to comply with section 13 (1) of the Act. Although the Court noted that calculation of the amount of the award would be problematic, that was not the reason it had not awarded damages. The State party argues that the Act does not deny a prisoner who is a victim of torture an enforceable right to compensation; it merely sets out preconditions for the award of compensation. It also argues that the complainant would have been entitled to compensation had he first used other complaints mechanisms, including the mechanism available through the Ombudsman’s Office. The State party refers to the judgment of the Court of Appeal and notes that the Court found that, 7 8 9 The State party refers to Human Rights Committee, communication No. 88/1981, Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay, in which the Committee found that the fact that the author had been allowed to receive only one visit from October 1980 to March 1981, that he had been held in a small cell without windows, where the artificial light was left on 24 hours a day, and that he had been kept in solitary confinement for over a month disclosed violations of articles 7 and 10 (1) of the Covenant. The Committee also took into account the State party’s failure to provide any of the information it had requested, including court decisions and health information relating to the prisoner, and the absence of confirmation that the prisoner had been given an opportunity to communicate with the Committee. The State party also refers to Human Rights Committee, communication No. 109/1981, Gómez de Voituret v. Uruguay and Polay Campos v. Peru (CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994), in which the Committee found that solitary confinement of six and nine months constituted violations of article 10 of the Covenant but not of article 7. The State party nonetheless notes that, in the latter case, the Committee found that solitary confinement of one year without communication with the outside world contravened article 7. The State party refers to A/66/268. The State party refers to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Simpson v. the Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case), judgment of 29 July 1994. 5