CAT/C/62/D/672/2015 although the author had requested an interview with the Ombudsman on 9 July 2000, he had later withdrawn the request. The State party also notes that the complainant did not file a claim in the courts until October 2004 and that the matter was not heard by the High Court until 2012. The State party contends that the complainant had ample opportunity to make a complaint to the prison authorities or the Ombudsman before filing a claim with the Courts and in the period between the submission and consideration of his claim by the High Court. 4.7 The State party notes that the complainant alleges that the right to receive compensation is limited because the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act requires that certain debts owed by the prisoner be paid out of the compensation. The State party argues that the requirement is not a limitation of the right to obtain compensation, as the debts are incurred by the prisoner separate to any right to obtain compensation. It argues that the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act sets up an efficient process to ensure that the prisoner repays those debts. It also notes that the complainant alleges that the Act fails to provide for substantive, comprehensive and individualized reparations. The State party argues that if a prisoner with a legitimate claim fulfils the preconditions of complaining through appropriate mechanisms, he or she will be entitled to substantive, comprehensive and individualized reparation as determined by the Court. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 In his comments on the State party’s observations, which he submitted on 21 January 2016, the complainant reiterates his argument that the State party’s reservation to article 14 is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and that the Committee should therefore find the complaint under article 14 to be admissible. The complainant also reiterates his view that the 21 days he spent in solitary confinement amounted to a violation of his rights under article 16. He contends that he did not appeal the Court of Appeal’s finding that the confinement did not amount to a breach of section 9 of the Bill of Rights to the Supreme Court — a point highlighted by the State party — because doing so would have been futile, as periods of solitary confinement longer than 21 days had not been found to be in violation of section 9 of the Bill of Rights in a number of previous cases. 5.2 The complainant further notes the State party’s argument that he was not awarded damages by the Court of Appeal because he had not made a claim under the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act. He claims that the Act is itself a bar to effective compensation, as the Inspector of Corrections and the Ombudsman are not lawfully able to award compensation, and that the obligation to exhaust that particular complaints mechanism first is a discriminatory hurdle in the way of compensation. He claims that those complaints mechanisms are valuable for minor complaints but not for more serious ones. He notes that the offices responsible for complaints mechanisms are understaffed. 10 The complainant again notes that any compensation awarded under the Act is subject to deductions and a sixmonth freeze. He claims that this process demeans prisoners and delays the receipt of any compensation that may be awarded. He notes that non-prisoners filing suit before the State party’s courts for violations of their rights under the Bill of Rights are not required to first submit complaints to the Ombudsman and that any damages they are awarded are not placed in trust for six months. 5.3 The complainant reiterates his claim that solitary confinement exceeding 15 days constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment and notes that rule 43 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) prohibits prolonged solitary confinement. He also notes that, under rule 44, prolonged solitary confinement is defined as confinement in excess of 15 consecutive days. The complainant requests the Committee to incorporate in its jurisprudence the view that solitary 10 6 The complainant refers to CAT/OP/NZL/1, in which the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment noted that most of the components of the national preventive mechanism had not received extra resources to carry out their mandate under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, a problem that, together with general staff shortages, had severely impeded their ability to fulfil that mandate.