(a) The universe of suspects In a situation where thousands of people were involved in committing systematic crimes, not everyone can be prosecuted. It is essential to establish a transparent set of criteria to explain the strategy of identifying suspects to be investigated and prosecuted.14 There can be many different approaches to prosecutorial strategy. For example, the vertical or longitudinal approach entails investigating and indicting perpetrators from different levels of the chain of command and building the case against the perpetrators at the apex. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) pursued this approach in its early years, when it proved impossible to obtain custody of anyone other than low- or mid-level perpetrators,15 although the focus subsequently changed to high-level perpetrators.16 Another approach, taken in recent years, deliberately restricts the focus to high-level perpetrators, as in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which explicitly focuses on prosecuting those bearing the greatest responsibility. (The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has already indicated that he will take a similar approach.) In recent international debate, the prevailing view has been that focusing on those with the greatest degree of responsibility is justified. This approach has its own challenges. Some argue that this position may suggest that those who implement plans or orders (the so-called triggerpullers) are somehow not morally culpable for their actions. There is also a question of whether victims would prefer to see prosecutions of those who planned or ordered atrocities or those who carried them out. The matter is obviously complex, but in situations where few people are likely to be brought to trial, choices must be made as to where scarce resources will be allocated. (Such a focused strategy is likely to have particular appeal in post-conflict situations, where the reintegration and rehabilitation of minor perpetrators is often a priority.) Conversely and at the other end of the spectrum, the pursuit of only low-level perpetrators may lead to a perception (if not a reality) of scapegoating. The first domestic proceeding held in Serbia and Montenegro since the Yugoslav conflict, relating to the Vukovar hospital massacre,17 focused on six low-ranking accused and has been widely criticized because it did not address 14 The criterion established by the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to identify suspects was there must be “a reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime.” See its report of 25 January 2005 to the United Nations Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 (2004). 15 See the address by its Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, to the United Nations Security Council, 27 November 2001. 16 S ee, for instance, Security Council resolution 1534 (2004). Part of the ICTY completion strategy is to plan for the handover of cases of lower-level perpetrators to the domestic jurisdiction. A special chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been created to receive such cases. 17 In this case, it was alleged that, in November 1991, Serbian military personnel removed up to 300 wounded Croatian soldiers and civilians from a hospital in Vukovar after the town had fallen, then took them to a remote farm, where they were executed.