CAT/C/64/D/641/2014 of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.22 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee’s practice in that context has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real” (see general comment No. 4, para. 11). Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: political affiliation or political activities of the complainant; previous torture; incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; and clandestine escape from the country of origin following threats of torture (see para. 45). The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned; however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the information available to it in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case (see para. 50). 8.5 In assessing the risk of torture in the present complaint, the Committee notes the complainant’s contention that he fears being arrested on political grounds and subjected to torture upon return to Côte d’Ivoire owing to his membership of the Ivorian Popular Front, which was previously in power in Côte d’Ivoire, and the work he did involving the wife of the country’s former President. In particular, in his capacity of coordinator for religious matters in Ms. Gbagbo’s cabinet, when the crisis that followed the presidential election of November 2010 began, the complainant was ordered to form a monitoring committee to investigate churches and mosques, which found weapons in the mosques, leading to attacks on those mosques. The Committee also notes the complainant’s claim that, owing to the aforementioned political activities, he was arrested on 20 April 2011 by a militia loyal to the current Ivorian authorities, detained for a week at the military camp in Abobo, where he was subjected to torture, and conditionally released upon payment of a bribe to the militiamen who held him in captivity. The Committee further notes the complainant’s assertion that he appeared in a documentary, which was filmed in Côte d’Ivoire in January 2012, giving an interview in the street about economic issues in the country, and that, subsequently, several of the participants in the documentary were arrested and accused of defaming the country. The Committee equally notes the complainant’s statement that, shortly after his return to Côte d’Ivoire from France in February 2012, he was followed, wiretapped and subjected to two attempted kidnappings and that the Ivorian authorities were still looking for him after his departure from the country in April 2012. Last but not least, the Committee notes the complainant’s argument that some of his political friends, who had returned to Côte d’Ivoire from Ghana and other countries of asylum, have been arrested and that torture is still common among persons who have been arrested for political reasons. 8.6 The Committee notes in this context that the State party does not question that the complainant worked with Ms. Gbagbo and that the State party’s asylum authorities equally did not question that he was detained by a militia in spring 2011 for a week and subjected to the ill-treatment described by him while in detention (see para. 4.7 above). The 22 See T.M. v. Republic of Korea (CAT/C/53/D/519/2012), para. 9.3; and Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 15.3. 9