CAT/C/47/D/327/2007 were two different matters. In his complaint before the Committee, the complainant had invoked article 3 of the Convention, which prohibited his extradition to a country in which there was a serious risk of him being subjected to torture, and aimed to show that the State party had violated the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by extraditing him to Mexico on 17 August 2007. He reiterates that the foreseeable, real and personal nature of the risk of torture was based on the fact that a prison guard had been killed during the complainant’s escape and that torture was a widespread practice in Mexican prisons. In his action before the Federal Court, the complainant sought to obtain compensation for having been tortured, not for the risk of being tortured. It was therefore wrong to suggest that the action before the Federal Court constituted a remedy yet to be exhausted. 10.2 The complainant maintains that the fact that a violation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has also been invoked before the Federal Court does not mean that the communication may be dismissed for a failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Before the Committee, the violation of the Convention itself constituted the prejudice, while before the Federal Court it constituted one of a series of alleged errors for which the State party might incur liability. The complainant also maintained that the communication before the Committee had been lodged on 4 July 2007, before he was tortured in Mexico on 17, 19 and 21 August 2007. The action before the Federal Court was begun only one and a half months later, and therefore did not need to be exhausted. Moreover, a claim for damages in civil proceedings was not an effective means of preventing the extradition of the complainant, and could not be used to achieve the aims of this communication against the State party. The complainant reiterates that he had taken his challenge against the extradition order as far as the Supreme Court, beyond which there were no further domestic remedies. State party’s supplementary submission on admissibility 11.1 On 10 February 2011, the State party submitted that the domestic proceedings were linked to those before the Committee inasmuch as they dealt with the same facts. It argues that the chronological order of proceedings or distinctions between the kinds of redress sought are of little importance, given that the findings of the domestic courts were to be based on consideration of the same allegations that had been submitted to the Committee. 11.2 On 26 August 2010, the complainant had requested a stay of his action before the Federal Court. The State party itself had requested that the action be dismissed. On 6 December 2010, the Federal Court had denied the complainant’s request for a stay of the action and granted the request for its dismissal, ruling that the question of the complainant’s extradition had already been considered in all the appropriate courts and could no longer be used as a cause of action. The request for dismissal of the action was granted because of an abuse of process by the complainant. On 10 January 2011, the time limit set by the Court for filing an action aimed at obtaining compensation for the events that supposedly occurred after the extradition, the complainant had brought a new action before the Federal Court. The State party reiterates its observations of 26 April 2010 and maintains that the communication should be declared inadmissible because of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 11.3 With regard to follow-up by consular officials, the State party explains that, by monitoring mechanisms, it meant the usual consular follow-up measures that reflected the State party’s concern for the physical and mental well-being of the complainant during his period of imprisonment in Mexico. 10