E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.3 page 14 still a centralized body of officials belonging to the executive branch. And even assuming it were an independent body, because of its role in the trial, it lacks the impartiality required to comply with article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Belarus is a party. 40. Although the new Criminal Procedure Code has introduced the possibility to challenge before a court the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s decision to detain or to prolong a detention, in practice, arrest and detention depend on the investigator. The court is only allowed to review certain procedural issues; this procedure could not be considered a habeas corpus remedy. It rather constitutes a prima facie control of the lawfulness of the procedure and is carried out in the absence of the accused person, by filing of the case. As a result, it often leads to the confirmation of the prosecutor’s decision. 41. The judges met by the Working Group reiterated that they were not competent to decide on the validity of proceedings or to interfere in the investigation. At this stage of the proceedings, they were limited to ensuring the conformity of the restriction of liberty with the applicable provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure. The Working Group is of the opinion that this lack of effective judicial oversight could lead to arbitrary detention. 42. During its visits to the pre-trial detention centres, the Working Group noticed that often the investigators carry out their interviews inside the prison, without the presence of defence lawyers. According to the information gathered, the majority of detainees are not able to retain the services of a private lawyer and many depend on legal aid. The detainees who were interviewed stated that the lawyer provided by the State usually is not effective and that he asks to be paid to visit his/her client in jail and assist him/her. 43. It is also assumed that the decision to place a person in detention, to extend the period of detention or to release the person is, in practice, the sole responsibility of the investigator and that the presence of a lawyer does not change the situation. Also, petitions to the prosecutor, his superior or to the court are of no avail. B. The lack of independence of the judiciary and the Bar Association 44. The Working Group notes with concern that the procedures relating to tenure, disciplinary matters and dismissal of judges at all levels do not comply with the principle of independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The procedure for the appointment of judges has changed considerably after the 1996 referendum. The main responsibility no longer lies with Parliament, but with the President of the Republic. The Working Group is particularly concerned that the judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court can be dismissed by the President of the Republic without any safeguards. 45. The Working Group is also concerned at the “Measures to improve the operation of the legal and notary professions in the Republic of Belarus” (Presidential decree No. 12 of 3 May 1997), which imply restrictions to access and practice of the legal profession and are not in conformity with the Basic Principles related to the role of Bar Associations. The Working Group is especially concerned at the exorbitant powers attributed to the Minister of Justice to control the exercise of the legal profession.