Advance unedited version CAT/C/60/D/701/2015
6.3
The Committee notes that the State party has contested the admissibility of the
complaint on the grounds that the complainant’s claims are manifestly unfounded. In the
light of the information on file and the arguments presented by the parties, the Committee
considers that, for purpose of admissibility, the complainant has sufficiently substantiated
his claims which raise serious issues under the Convention. Accordingly, the Committee
finds that the communication is admissible.
6.4
As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the
communication submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with
its consideration of the merits.
Consideration of the merits
7.1
In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered
the present communication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties
concerned.
7.2
In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the
complainant to Pakistan would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under
article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.
7.3
In the present case, the Committee must assess whether there are substantial grounds
for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to
torture upon return to Pakistan. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account
all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the
existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the
country of return. The Committee recalls that the aim of the evaluation is to establish
whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of
being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. The
existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country
therefore does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country, and
additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be
personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of
human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her
specific circumstances.6
7.4
The Committee recalls its General Comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of
article 3 of the Convention, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on
grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the
test of being highly probable, the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls
on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable,
real and personal risk.7 The Committee recalls that under the terms of General Comment
No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State
party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and has the power,
provided by article 22 (4), of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the
full set of circumstances in every case.
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7
See, for example, Communication No. 550/2013, S.K. and others v. Sweden, Views adopted on 8
May 2015, paragraph. 7.3.
See, for example, Communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 14
November 2003, paragraph. 7.3.
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