CAT/C/57/D/529/2012 complainant, the date, seal and signature fields of the document have all been left blank. The Urdu version does not appear to have a date of issuance or to be marked by a judicial stamp that would indicate that it was issued. The State party submitted that the importance of the second piece of evidence is extremely limited. 6.2 The State party maintained that the new evidence provided with the complainant’s comments did not support her contention that her removal to Pakistan in 2013 would violate article 3 of the Convention. At best, the newly provided documents slightly enhanced substantiation of her assertion that, in 2006, B. had sought to have the Pakistani authorities pursue criminal charges against her in relation to his accusation of adultery. The documents do not provide substantiation as to whether the Pakistani authorities had taken any steps, beyond the filing of the first information report accusing her of adultery, in 2006; whether the complainant had ever been detained and mistreated by Pakistani State authorities; whether the first information report and/or its accompanying arrest warrant that she submitted in 2013 are valid or enforceable documents; whether, in 2013, the Pakistani State authorities had any interest in pursuing the allegation made by B. in 2006; and whether, in 2013, B. or other private individuals had any interest in pursuing the allegations made in 2006. The State party reiterated that the complainant had not substantiated the core factual allegation that she had been tortured in Pakistan in 2006, while being in police detention on a false accusation of adultery. Although the evidence submitted by the complainant supports the allegation that she was involved in a long-running and occasionally violent dispute with her former husband’s relatives, there is no evidence to substantiate that the police or any other State actors acquiesced in any of the violent acts allegedly committed by these private actors. There is also no evidence to suggest that any violence by these private actors escalated to such a level that it could be considered “torture”, as defined in article 1 of the Convention. 6.3 The State party reiterated its previous submission regarding the substantiation of the claims. It noted that the complainant’s additional comments did not address the question of an internal flight or relocation alternative and reiterated its arguments in that regard. 6.4 The State party also noted that, with respect to the remedial avenue of applying for leave to seek judicial review of the Refugee Protection Division decision, the complainant did not raise any issues with the effectiveness of the remedy in her initial communication to the Committee. It maintained that judicial review of Refugee Protection Division decisions in the Federal Court was an effective remedy and a key element of its system that has been consistently recognized by the Committee as a procedure that must be exhausted for the purposes of admissibility of a communication.13 It referred to several communications in which the Committee had noted that applications for leave and judicial review were not mere formalities, but that the Federal Court may, in appropriate cases, look at the substance of a case.14 It maintained that the current system of judicial review by the Federal Court does provide for judicial review of the merits of a case, in the sense that it allows for review of both the legal procedure and the facts. The Federal Court reviews Immigration and Refugee Board decisions for factual errors or errors involving both facts and law, generally based on a reasonableness standard, in deference to the expertise of the tribunal. However, the Court may review, based on a correctness standard, any aspect of the decision of the 13 14 See for example communications No. 307/2006, E.Y. v. Canada, decision adopted on 4 November 2009, paras. 9.3-9.4; L.Z.B. v. Canada, para. 6.6; P.S.S. v. Canada, para. 6.2; P.S. v. Canada, para. 6.2; R.K. v. Canada, para. 7.2; L.O. v. Canada, para. 6.5; M.A. v. Canada, para. 3; B.S.S. v. Canada, para. 11.6; and Aung. v. Canada, para. 6.3. See Aung. v. Canada, para. 6.3; and L.Z.B. v. Canada, para. 6.6. 13