01005735 Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC E313 Khmer Republic soldiers and officials.354 Despite the lack of a written policy, it was Philip SHORT’s view that that the uniformity of the treatment of Khmer Republic soldiers indicates that such a policy must have existed.355 Second, the evidence concerning the CPK treatment of former soldiers or officials of the Khmer Republic prior to 1975 within the liberated zone arises mainly from post-1979 interviews of refugees outside of Cambodia, many of whom were former Khmer Rouge cadre who would have an incentive to minimise evidence of mistreatment. Nonetheless, even these accounts support the conclusion that there was an increasing use of revolutionary violence.356 123. The radicalisation of CPK policy targeting groups of individuals considered to be enemies such as former Khmer Republic soldiers or officials is also consistent with the Party’s increasing use of revolutionary violence against enemies both internal and external, including, as noted above, former Central Committee member Prasith and so-called Hanoi Khmer who had studied in Vietnam.357 If violence was now appropriate for internal enemies, it would also be required against external enemies. 3.3.4.2. The “Experience” of Oudong 124. The CPK’s merciless policy is cogently illustrated by the execution of Khmer Republic soldiers following the evacuation of the town of Oudong. On 18 March 1974, CPK forces under the overall charge of Ta Mok and ultimately the head of the Special Zone, SON Sen,358 captured the town of Oudong.359 Based on interviews with 354 T. 8 May 2013 (Philip SHORT), pp. 100-102 (Because there was not written directive setting forth the policy of extermination, the policy was not absolutely uniform and not every LON Nol soldier was killed.”); cf. Section 14: Joint Criminal Enterprise, paras 814-818 (noting later directives to kill Khmer Republic officials). 355 T. 8 May 2013 (Philip SHORT), pp. 100-102. 356 See e.g. Report by S. HEDER and M. MATSUSHITA: Interviews with Kampuchean Refugees at Thai-Cambodia Border, E3/1714, February-March 1980, ERN (En) 00170732 (PHAK Lim who is described as one of the top leaders of KR refugees and likely a member of the CPK states, “At that time [around 1974] if we have captured anyone in the area in which I was fighting he would have been sent to the Special Region, not to the Southwest Region. This was the case for example with POW’s and agents. At that time agents were considered more vicious than POW’s., most POW’s were forgiven while most agents were executed.”); Book by B. KIERNAN: How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975, E3/1815, 1985, ERN (En) 00487493 (“the increased bombing, however, were following in 1973 by large-scale executions of ‘all’ captured Lon Nol troops and militia, and also of traders, the district chief reports.”) 357 See Section 3: Historical Background, paras 117-118. 358 T. 3 October 2012 (MEAS Voeun), p. 111; T. 9 January 2013 (UNG Ren), p. 38. 359 T. 10 July 2013 (Stephen HEDER), pp. 86-87; T. 11 July 2013 (Stephen HEDER), p. 5; T. 19 June Case 002/01, Judgement, 7 August 2014 - Public 68